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ABSTRACT 
  For nearly sixty years, the U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed that the 
Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees felony 
defendants the right to counsel, regardless of their ability to pay. Yet 
nearly all criminal procedure scholars agree that indigent defense as 
practiced today falls far short of its initial promise. These scholars 
frequently cite a lack of political support, insufficient public funding, 
and a failure to address instances of inadequate legal representation, 
among other things, as causes for the underlying systemic dysfunction. 
  This Article contends that these conventional critiques are 
incomplete. Rather, indigent defense systems often fail due to poor 
design, as they do not align publicly funded defense attorneys with their 
clients’ best interests. This is particularly true when courts appoint 
private attorneys to represent indigent defendants for a fee, as is done 
in hundreds of jurisdictions across the United States. These assignment 
systems create an “incentive gap” that financially motivates defense 
attorneys to maximize their caseloads but minimize their efforts. 
  The Article then shows how campaign finance exacerbates this 
problem. Specifically, we provide empirical evidence that elected trial 
court judges regularly appoint attorneys who donate to their campaigns 
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as counsel for indigent defendants—a system we call “judicial pay to 
play.” We find trial judges routinely accept such donations, often as 
apparent “entry fees” from attorneys who have just become eligible for 
appointments. These judges, in turn, typically award their donors more 
than double the cases they award to non-donors, with the average 
donor attorney earning greater than a twenty-seven-fold return on her 
donation. Indeed, we find indigent defense appointments can be 
surprisingly lucrative. Many donor attorneys earn tens or even 
hundreds of thousands of dollars across the hundreds of cases assigned 
to them by their donee judges. 
  Worse yet, this apparent quid pro quo between judges and defense 
attorneys may directly harm defendants. We find that defense attorneys 
who donate to a judge are, if anything, less successful than non-donor 
attorneys in attaining charge reductions, dismissals, and acquittals, or 
avoiding prison sentences. We contend donor attorneys might 
underperform simply because they take on so many more cases from 
their donee judges, and hence spend less time on each matter. 
  Our study is the first empirical analysis of how campaign finance 
distorts criminal trial court decisionmaking. Though our data is limited 
to Harris County (Houston), Texas—the nation’s third most populous 
county—we show that pay to play is probably endemic across that state. 
Indeed, similar problems likely affect millions of Americans, as trial 
judges who control indigent defense assignments in many other states—
including California, Georgia, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, 
and Ohio, among others—accept attorney donations to fund their 
electoral campaigns. Unless substantial reforms are made to address 
the corrosive influence of campaign finance on criminal defense, the 
Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel will continue to ring hollow for 
millions of indigent defendants. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Were they alive today, Johnny Ray Johnson and Keith Steven 
Thurmond would be experts on what happens when indigent 
defendants are not assigned competent counsel. Both were inmates on 
death row in Texas.1 In 2004, Johnson’s appointed attorney, Jerome 
Godinich, missed the deadline to file a petition for federal habeas 
corpus relief.2 Godinich claimed a malfunctioning filing machine failed 
 
 1. Lise Olsen, Slow Paperwork in Death Row Cases Ends Final Appeals for 9, HOUS. 
CHRON. (Mar. 21, 2009, 5:30 AM) [hereinafter Olsen, Slow Paperwork], https://www.chron.com/
news/houston-texas/article/Slow-paperwork-in-death-row-cases-ends-final-1736308.php [https://
perma.cc/U3J3-HG6M].  
 2. Id.; Mark Bennett, An Embarrassment Even to Criminal Defense Lawyers, BENNETT & 
BENNETT (Mar. 23, 2009), https://blog.bennettandbennett.com/2009/03/an-embarrassment-even-
to-criminal-defense-lawyers [https://perma.cc/73X8-V9HD].  
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to date-stamp the petition, which he filed after the court had already 
closed on the deadline date.3 His client eventually lost on appeal and 
was executed.4 Months after the first missed deadline, Godinich missed 
the same deadline in Thurmond’s case.5 His excuse? The same 
malfunctioning filing machine.6 The delay foreclosed a petition from 
Thurmond,7 who was also eventually put to death.8 
Sadly, cases like these are not rare. Although many indigent 
defense counsel perform admirably for their clients, others have fallen 
asleep during a client’s capital murder trial,9 or allowed their client to 
remain locked up in pretrial detention for seventeen months before 
investigating facts in a drug possession case in which no drugs were 
ever found.10 There is, unfortunately, no shortage of such horror 
stories. 
More prosaically, public defenders and assigned defense counsel 
often fail their clients simply because they are spread too thin across 
too many cases. Many of these attorneys handle hundreds of matters 
at the same time,11 practically precluding them from conducting a 
focused investigation on any one case or providing truly individualized 
counsel to any one defendant. It is no surprise that the vast majority of 
indigent defendants simply do the most expeditious thing and quickly 
 
 3. Bennett, supra note 2.  
 4. Olsen, Slow Paperwork, supra note 1.  
 5. Id. 
 6. Id.; Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 12, Thurmond v. Quarterman, 341 F. App’x 40 (5th 
Cir. 2009) (No. 08-70008). 
 7. See Thurmond v. Thaler, No. 08-70008, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 1608, at *6–8 (5th Cir. 
Jan. 25, 2011). 
 8. Nancy Flake, Thurmond Dies for 2001 Double Murder, HOUS. CHRON. (Mar. 12, 2012, 
7:55 PM), https://www.chron.com/neighborhood/magnolia/news/article/Thurmond-dies-for-2001-
double-murder-9554317.php [https://perma.cc/8836-YNCZ].  
 9. See Carol S. Steiker, Gideon at Fifty: A Problem of Political Will, 122 YALE L.J. 2694, 
2696 (2013) (citing Henry Weinstein, A Sleeping Lawyer and a Ticket to Death Row, L.A. TIMES 
(July 15, 2000, 12:00 AM), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/jul/15/news/mn-53250 [https://
perma.cc/NZ5J-PK9J]). In another case, a prosecutor claimed in his opening statement that the 
state would prove the defendant’s guilt in a rape and murder trial through bite mark evidence. Id. 
at 2695. The indigent defense counsel did not respond to the comment, “the functional equivalent 
of endorsing [the prosecutor’s] opening statement.” Id. The defendant was exonerated after 
sixteen years in prison. Id. 
 10. Lise Olsen, Hundreds of Indigent Inmates Jailed for Months Pretrial, HOUS. CHRON. 
(Oct. 3, 2009, 5:30 AM), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Hundreds-of-
indigent-inmates-jailed-for-months-1566415.php [https://perma.cc/NJ7J-J57W].  
 11. See, e.g., Steiker, supra note 9, at 2696 (“In Miami-Dade County, Florida, the average 
felony caseload per lawyer has reached five hundred in recent years due to budget cuts.”). 
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plead guilty to whatever deal they are offered—often after being 
encouraged to do so by their own lawyer.12 
This dynamic has led many criminal procedure scholars and 
practicing attorneys to assail the state of indigent defense in America. 
To illustrate, the Yale Law Journal held a symposium in 201313 to 
commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright,14 the 
landmark Supreme Court decision that established a right to counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for all state 
felony defendants.15 The occasion, however, turned out to be more 
lamentation than celebration, as legal scholars and practitioners 
pointed out the persistent failures of indigent defense systems across 
the country again,16 and again,17 and again.18 
Most of these critiques rely in some part on a standard narrative 
centering on money and power.19 Critics recognize that while Gideon 
 
 12. See Jeanette Hussemann & Jonah Siegel, Pleading Guilty: Indigent Defendant 
Perceptions of the Plea Process, 13 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 459, 464–69 (2019).  
 13. Yale Law Journal Symposium To Examine Impact and Legacy of Gideon v. Wainwright 
Case, YALE L. SCH. (Mar. 6, 2013), https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/yale-law-journal-
symposium-examine-impact-and-legacy-gideon-v-wainwright-case [https://perma.cc/LXJ4-88VE]. 
 14. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  
 15. Id. at 342, 345. Indigent capital defendants have had the right to counsel since the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). 
 16. See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Searching for Solutions to the Indigent Defense Crisis in 
the Broader Criminal Justice Reform Agenda, 122 YALE L.J. 2316, 2318 (2013) (“[F]ifty years after 
Gideon was decided, there is near-universal acceptance of the notion that our system of indigent 
defense is broken.”); Pamela R. Metzger, Fear of Adversariness: Using Gideon To Restrict 
Defendants’ Invocation of Adversary Procedures, 122 YALE L.J. 2550, 2552 (2013) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court has used Gideon to decrease the protection of Sixth Amendment rights that 
constitute the core structures of the American adjudicatory process.”). 
 17. See generally Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance 
After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150 (2013) (arguing that indigent defense systems 
are underfunded and allow inadequate representation). These critiques are not new. See, e.g., 
Victoria Nourse, Gideon’s Muted Trumpet, 58 MD. L. REV. 1417, 1417 (1999) (“Once the darling 
of the legal academy, criminal procedure has fallen into disrepute.”); see also id. at 1431 (“The 
importance of the lawyer . . . is not someone to try a case (most cases are never tried), but 
someone to stand with the individual citizen unaligned to the forces that laid him low and resist 
claims of the natural and inevitable superiority of government.”). 
 18. See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Race and the Disappointing Right to Counsel, 122 YALE 
L.J. 2236 (2013) (claiming Gideon may have actually exacerbated racial discrimination in criminal 
justice enforcement rather than mitigating it).  
 19. See, e.g., Bright & Sanneh, supra note 17, at 2156, 2160. By contrast, a few critiques cut 
much deeper. In particular, Professor Paul Butler argues Gideon itself was misguided and has led 
to more harm than good. He contends that by coating the trial process with a false veneer of 
objectivity and fairness, the right to counsel might actually obfuscate the system’s true goal of 
subjugating poor and Black people. See generally Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and 
the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176 (2013) (“Arguably, Gideon has not improved the 
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mandated states to provide counsel for indigent defendants, this 
mandate was unfunded.20 Political actors, in turn, lacked the will to 
provide the resources necessary to make a poor defendant’s right to 
counsel more than a symbolic gesture.21 Combined with a substantial 
increase in prosecutorial power,22 as well as the Supreme Court’s 
reticence to put substantial teeth into the requirement that appointed 
counsel actually be effective,23 the manifest failures of indigent defense 
in America are hardly surprising. 
Certainly, this narrative contains a good bit of truth. But, as we 
show here, it is incomplete. Funding alone will not solve the problem, 
particularly in the context of assigned counsel systems where courts 
pay private attorneys to represent poor defendants. Such systems, 
which are used in hundreds of jurisdictions across the country, are 
undoubtedly underfunded on the whole. But that does not mean they 
are not highly profitable for some. We show that many defense 
attorneys make tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars in a given 
year across assignments from a single judge. 
Moreover, these attorneys often continue to receive such 
assignments even after they have been revealed to be woefully 
incompetent. For example, in the years after Messrs. Johnson and 
Thurmond were executed, Jerome Godinich was appointed as counsel 
in state court for hundreds of other felony defendants, continuing to 
 
situated of accused persons, and may even have worsened their plight.”). As Butler notes, similar 
arguments have also been raised in other parts of the legal system. Id. at 2198–99; see, e.g., Louis 
Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 719 (1992) (arguing that Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), “served 
to stabilize and legitimate the status quo by creating the illusion of closure and cohesion”); see 
also WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2 (2011) (noting that 
accused persons have fared worse as rights have ostensibly expanded). 
 20. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Lessons from Gideon, 122 YALE L.J. 2676, 2680 (2013) 
(“The Court imposed an unfunded mandate on state governments without any enforcement 
mechanism, and the Court then undermined the one remedy available to the judiciary, the ability 
to find ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 
 21. See, e.g., Steiker, supra note 9, at 2700 (“Moving from courtroom to classroom to 
boardroom has made clear to me that any thoroughgoing solution to our Sixth Amendment 
quandary is less a matter of law than one of political will.”). 
 22. See generally David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 106 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 473 (2016) (addressing various theories why prosecutorial power 
has grown, concluding that prosecutors’ roles as “mediating figures” in the criminal justice system 
play a central role in their increase in power). 
 23. See infra notes 70–74 and accompanying text (discussing Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984), and succeeding cases).  
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amass a record of inadequate representation during this time.24 Judges 
could have appointed other lawyers to these cases. Why did they 
continue to appoint the same underperforming attorneys? 
The proximate cause25 may lie in campaign finance. Godinich was 
assigned the majority of his felony cases from one trial court judge, Jim 
Wallace. Godinich was also a significant donor to Judge Wallace. 
Between 2005 and 2014, Godinich donated on at least seven occasions 
a total of $9,000 to Judge Wallace’s electoral campaigns. Between 2004 
and 2018, Judge Wallace appointed Godinich to at least 1,974 cases, 
including five capital cases. And since 2014, Godinich has earned at 
least $872,642.50 from cases before Judge Wallace. Clearly, some 
indigent defense attorneys are not just scraping by.26 
Though Godinich is an outlier, the nexus between campaign 
finance and indigent defense extends far beyond him. This Article 
exposes that hidden connection. In particular, we present empirical 
evidence of a practice we call “judicial pay to play,” where defense 
attorneys donate to elected judges to obtain or maintain access to 
indigent defense cases. 
The Article creates the first large-scale database linking trial court 
campaign contributions with multiple criminal court datasets. 
Specifically, our data comprise the universe of 290,633 felony cases 
from January 2005 through May 2018 where defense counsel was 
assigned and ascertainable in Harris County, the nation’s third most 
 
 24. See Casey Tolan, She Watched Her Husband Get Sentenced to Death. Now She’s 
Becoming a Lawyer To Save Him and Others., SPLINTER (Oct. 24, 2016, 12:07 PM), https://
splinternews.com/she-watched-her-husband-get-sentenced-to-death-now-she-1793863088 
[https://perma.cc/6ZCU-Y79A] (reporting that Godinich and his second chair attorney did not 
meet with the defendant until just before trial, conducted almost no investigation, and further, 
“at times during jury deliberations, neither of Juan’s lawyers were present while the judge and 
prosecutors responded to questions from the jury by themselves.” When Godinich was 
confronted, he said, “I have another trial to take care of.”); see also Stephen B. Bright, 
Independence of Counsel: An Essential Requirement for Competent Counsel and a Working 
Adversary System, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 853, 869–70 (2018) (“[Jerome Godinich] was assigned 406 
felony cases at the trial level in 2017—more than twice the national standard of 150 felony cases—
as well as 8 capital cases, and 7 felony appeals.” (citations omitted)). 
 25. We say proximate cause because we recognize, as critical legal studies scholars have 
argued, that deeper societal problems might be common drivers of all of these phenomena. If 
indeed “prison is for the poor, and not the rich,” Butler, supra note 19, at 2178, then the whole 
system of judicial campaign finance might be yet another system that was created to be indifferent 
or even hostile to the interests of the poor. 
 26. These numbers were obtained from our underlying combined dataset; for details on how 
it was created, see infra Part III.B. These data, which include information on campaign donations 
and assigned cases in Harris County, allow us to identify judge–attorney pairings like the Wallace–
Godinich pairing described here. 
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populous county27 and the home of the city of Houston. Although a few 
recent pieces of scholarship have looked at how campaign donations 
might influence elected state supreme court justices,28 this Article is the 
first to explore how campaign finance might affect trial court 
decisionmaking and criminal case outcomes. 
What we find is shocking. Trial judges routinely accept donations 
from defense attorneys who practice before them. Worse, judges often 
accept these donations as an apparent “entry fee” from counsel soon 
after they become eligible for indigent defense appointments. And 
while donor and non-donor attorneys appear similar in terms of their 
education and experience, on average, judges assign their donors more 
than double the number of cases they assign to non-donors. Such 
assignments are flatly inconsistent with the rotation or “wheel” 
assignment system established under Texas law.29 
In addition, we find these preferential assignment patterns enable 
donors to earn on average more than double the total attorney’s fees 
of non-donors. And the total amount of these fees can be quite 
significant: the average donor earns $31,081 in attorney’s fees from her 
donee judge.30 Put another way, if pay to play exists, then our 
regression analysis suggests that the average defense attorney receives 
more than a twenty-seven-fold return on her campaign contributions.31 
 
 27. Infra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 28. See Damon M. Cann, Justice for Sale? Campaign Contributions and Judicial 
Decisionmaking, 7 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 281, 281 (2007) (finding that “campaign contributions 
[were] indeed correlated with judges’ decisions” when “[l]ooking at cases decided in the Supreme 
Court of Georgia’s 2003 term”); Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of 
Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decision, 86 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 69, 73 (2011) (finding elected state supreme court justices in partisan elections are more 
likely to rule in favor of business interests as donations from those interested parties increase); 
Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 625 (2009) 
(providing correlative data to suggest “state supreme court judges routinely adjust their rulings 
to attract votes and campaign money”). 
 29. See infra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.  
 30. See infra Table 3. 
 31. To clarify how extraordinary this return is: if someone had invested $10,000 in a portfolio 
that replicated the S&P 500 in March 2009, the market low during the Great Recession, and sold 
in July 2019, when the market recently peaked, their portfolio would have grown to $48,708.38—
just less than a 5-fold increase. See PK, S&P 500 Periodic Reinvestment Calculator (With 
Dividends), DON’T QUIT YOUR DAY JOB (last updated June 2020), https://dqydj.com/sp-500-
periodic-reinvestment-calculator-dividends [https://perma.cc/TH2F-YELG]. Moreover, as 
explained later, these return estimates are, if anything, significantly underestimated, as we only 
have reliable attorney revenue data from 2014–2018 and not from earlier years. See infra notes 
176, 191 and accompanying text. 
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More troubling, the apparent quid pro quo we observe might 
directly harm indigent defendants. We find that, if anything, defense 
attorneys who donate to judges are less successful than those who do 
not in terms of attaining charge reductions, dismissals, and acquittals, 
or avoiding prison sentences for their clients. These results are not 
driven solely by observable differences in assigned cases or defendant 
characteristics, or unobservable differences that remain fixed over 
time. We suggest that, similar to the conventional narrative on 
overworked public defenders, donor attorneys might underperform 
simply because they take on so many more cases from their donee 
judges, and hence have less time to spend on each matter.32 
The Article also presents qualitative evidence, based on news 
reports and interviews with practicing attorneys in Texas, suggesting 
these phenomena are endemic across the state. Furthermore, we 
explain why these problems might exist throughout the country, as trial 
judges in many other states—including California, Georgia, Maryland, 
Missouri, North Carolina, and Ohio, among others—can also receive 
donations from attorneys and control assignments of indigent defense 
counsel.33 
Some might view these results as yet another nail in the coffin of 
Gideon—as further proof that America’s grand experiment with 
indigent defense is a failure and that societal forces will ensure it 
continues to be a failure, absent sweeping social and political change. 
Perhaps this is true. But we argue, more modestly, that our research 
reveals the more immediate problem is one of misaligned incentives. 
In today’s system, no one’s interests are truly aligned with those of 
indigent defendants. Instead, assigned counsel are often financially 
incentivized to dispose of indigent defense cases as quickly as possible, 
with as little effort as possible—motives that better align with the 
interests of zealous prosecutors and docket-conscious judges than 
those of poor defendants. 
We argue that this “incentive gap” is an underappreciated fault at 
the heart of the right to counsel. We further explain that while modest 
reforms to attorney assignment rules and campaign finance regulations 
might reduce pay to play, they are unlikely on their own to solve the 
problem or substantially improve the lot of poor defendants absent 
deeper structural changes altering attorney incentives. 
 
 32. See infra Part III.D.4.  
 33. See infra notes 226–37 and accompanying text. 
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Part I provides a brief history of indigent defense in the United 
States, starting before Gideon and moving to present day. Part II then 
overviews the three main models of indigent defense in America: 
assigned counsel, contract, and public defender systems. It further 
explains how each of these systems creates attorney incentives at odds 
with those of indigent defendants. It also provides qualitative evidence 
on how campaign finance interacts with these assignment systems to 
further distort attorney incentives and widen the incentive gap. 
Part III turns toward our empirical findings. After describing how 
the dataset was constructed, it provides summary statistics, regression 
specifications, and graphical evidence showing how pay to play likely 
influences indigent defense appointments in Harris County. Part IV 
briefly lays out some policy proposals seeking to eliminate pay to play. 
It further explains why such proposals are unlikely to be successful or 
to substantially improve the quality of indigent defense unless they are 
also accompanied by deeper structural reforms. 
I.  THE PROMISE AND FAILURE OF GIDEON: A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
The origins of the right to counsel in the United States began long 
before Gideon in 1963. Twelve of the original thirteen colonies 
declared some form of this right in early versions of their state 
constitutions, despite the English common law denying such a right 
existed.34 The Supreme Court described this split from the common law 
in Holden v. Hardy,35 decided at the turn of the twentieth century: 
The earlier practice of the common law . . . so far as it deprived him 
of the assistance of counsel and compulsory process for the 
attendance of his witnesses . . . had not been changed in England. But 
to the credit of her American colonies, let it be said that so oppressive 
a doctrine had never obtained a foothold there.36 
By the early twentieth century, “every state . . . had established 
the right to have the assistance of counsel similar to that found in the 
Sixth Amendment”37 and required the appointment of counsel in 
 
 34. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61–65 (1932). 
 35. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).  
 36. Id. at 386.  
 37. The Story of the Scottsboro Boys in Powell v. Alabama, SIXTH AMEND. CTR., https://
sixthamendment.org/the-right-to-counsel/history-of-the-right-to-counsel/the-story-of-the-
scottsboro-boys [https://perma.cc/GVL6-SRWM]; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all 
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capital cases.38 Nonetheless, the scope of the right was inconsistent 
across states, with one scholar estimating that by the early 1930s, 
approximately half of all states had yet to extend the right to counsel 
to non-capital cases.39 
The calculus began to shift with the Supreme Court’s 1932 
decision in Powell v. Alabama.40 In Powell, the Court overturned the 
conviction of six young men charged with rape on the grounds that they 
had been denied access to counsel.41 The Powell Court found that in 
capital cases, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was a fundamental 
right encompassed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.42  
This “fundamental fairness” test soon became a part of Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence. The Court next applied it in the context of 
a federal criminal trial in 1938’s Johnson v. Zerbst.43 In Johnson, two 
men facing federal counterfeiting charges were denied access to 
counsel, ultimately being convicted and sentenced.44 In overturning the 
convictions, the Johnson Court definitively established a right to 
counsel in all federal criminal proceedings.45 
Still, the Court was not yet ready to extend the right to counsel to 
encompass state proceedings. In Betts v. Brady,46 a defendant charged 
with a non-capital crime in Maryland challenged the state court’s 
refusal to appoint him counsel.47 Rather than require counsel be 
 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for 
his defence.”). 
 38. The Story of the Scottsboro Boys in Powell v. Alabama, supra note 37. 
 39. Id. (citing HUGH RICHARD WILLIAMS, THE HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO FREE COUNSEL 
IN AMERICA 29 (2001)). 
 40. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 45 (1932). 
 41. Id. at 65. An out-of-state lawyer, who had previously offered to help local counsel, 
refused an appointment to act as counsel for the defendants. Id. at 56. Subsequently, the trial 
judge appointed all the members of the local bar as counsel but neglected to name an individual 
lawyer to act in that capacity. Id. 
 42. Id. at 71. 
 43. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
 44. Id. at 459–60. The district attorney in the case denied the defendants’ request for counsel 
on the grounds that the state courts did not appoint counsel unless the defendant was charged 
with a capital crime. Id. at 460. 
 45. Id. at 467 (“Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime 
to the assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential 
jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court’s authority to deprive an accused of his life or 
liberty.”). 
 46. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
 47. Id. at 456–58. 
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available for indigent defendants in all state criminal proceedings, the 
Betts Court pointed to the variety of access to counsel constitutional 
provisions and statutes as proof that “in the great majority of the 
States, it has been the considered judgment of the people, their 
representatives and their courts that appointment of counsel is not a 
fundamental right, essential to a fair trial.”48 The Court then 
enumerated a “special circumstances” test as to whether a state had 
violated a defendant’s due process rights by denying them access to 
counsel.49 
Many state supreme courts and legislatures responded to Betts by 
affirming their support for the right to counsel, and by the late 1950s, 
thirty-five states required counsel be appointed in non-capital cases to 
at least some degree.50 This affirmation of the right to counsel belied 
the Betts Court’s holding that the right was not considered 
fundamental.  
Indeed, the Court revisited that issue just over twenty years later 
in Gideon.51 There, as in Betts, the defendant faced felony charges in 
state court, this time in Florida.52 Like in Betts, the trial court denied 
the defendant’s request to provide an attorney when the defendant was 
unable to hire his own.53 Reversing their decision in Betts, the Gideon 
Court unanimously found that the right to counsel was essential to a 
 
 48. Id. at 471. 
 49. See id. at 463–64 (“[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, 
and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, 
illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for  
him . . . .”); see also Abe Krash, The Architects of the Gideon Decision: Abe Fortas and Justice 
Hugo Black, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (2014) (explaining that Betts held “that in a state criminal 
prosecution of an indigent defendant that did not involve the death sentence, the constitutional 
right to the assistance of a lawyer depended on whether there were special circumstances in the 
case such that, without counsel, the defendant’s conviction would be regarded as fundamentally 
unfair” (citing Betts, 316 U.S. at 462, 473)).  
 50. The Post-Betts Era in the States’ Courts, SIXTH AMEND. CTR., https://
sixthamendment.org/the-right-to-counsel/history-of-the-right-to-counsel/the-post-betts-era 
[https://perma.cc/LBS9-37NZ]. Moreover, special circumstances were found in almost every case, 
making the test a mere formality to obtain appointed counsel. See Stacey L. Reed, A Look Back 
at Gideon v. Wainwright After Forty Years: An Examination of the Illusory Sixth Amendment 
Right to Assistance of Counsel, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 47, 51 (2003) (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE  
§ 11.1 (3d ed. 2000)). 
 51. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 338 (1963). The Court noted in its decision that 
22 states, as amici, argued that Betts was “an anachronism when handed down,” and should be 
overruled. Id. at 345 (internal quotations omitted). 
 52. Id. at 336–37. 
 53. Id. at 337. 
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fair trial in state criminal proceedings, remarking that “reason and 
reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of 
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a 
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for 
him.”54 
Writing for the Court, Justice Hugo Black framed the issue in 
terms of resources and incentives for all parties involved. Noting that 
government actions and the behavior of wealthy defendants rendered 
access to counsel essential for a fair trial, he stated: 
That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have 
the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the 
wide-spread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not 
luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be 
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but 
it is in ours.55 
Justice Black concluded that the ideals of American government 
necessitated the appointment of counsel to indigent defendants in state 
courts, noting that “[f]rom the very beginning, our state and national 
constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and 
substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials.”56 He further 
stated that this “noble ideal cannot be realized” if an indigent 
defendant has to face trial without a lawyer’s assistance.57  
Gideon was warmly received by the public,58 inspiring the award-
winning book Gideon’s Trumpet.59 And in subsequent years, the Court 
continued to expand the situations in which the right to counsel was 
deemed necessary, holding that it attaches from the time of 
indictment60 to the time of a defendant’s first appeal.61 The Court 
 
 54. Id. at 344. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Reed, supra note 50, at 51 (citing LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND 
AMERICAN POLITICS 379 (2000)). 
 59. Id. at 51–52. See generally ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1964) (retelling the 
story of Gideon v. Wainwright). 
 60. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205–06 (1964); see also Rothgery v. Gillespie 
Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 211–12 (2008) (stating the right to counsel was triggered at criminal 
defendant’s initial appearance before a magistrate judge). 
 61. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963) (a companion case to Gideon); see 
also Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 616–24 (2005) (holding that a state may not deny an 
attorney to a defendant who seeks to appeal after entering a guilty plea); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
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subsequently extended the right to probation revocation hearings62 and 
juvenile delinquency proceedings.63 Additionally, nearly a decade after 
Gideon, the Court ruled that the right to counsel applies in any criminal 
case resulting in actual imprisonment,64 putting to rest many questions 
about Gideon’s scope. 
Yet, even the most ardent supporters of Gideon acknowledged 
that significant resources would need to be marshalled to ensure the 
right to counsel was actually robust in practice. In his famous 1965 law 
review article, Professor Henry Monaghan forewarned the coming 
tension between Gideon’s promise and the practical and logistical 
problems that might arise: “Gideon’s little regiment had no real 
difficulty in running up its colors, but it is quite apparent that an army—
a very large one—must be raised if the victory is to be a lasting one.”65 
By the time Gideon’s Trumpet was turned into a popular television 
movie starring actor Henry Fonda in 1980,66 the shortcomings of that 
decision had become painfully apparent. Many states had failed to take 
the steps needed to effectively comply with the ruling. These failures 
continue today, with many scholars attributing the continued crisis in 
access to counsel to weaknesses and oversights in Gideon itself. 
In particular, a key limitation of Gideon was that it did not define, 
let alone mandate, the system by which assigned counsel would be 
 
U.S. 12, 18–20 (1956) (noting that due process and equal protection require states to pay for an 
indigent defendant’s trial transcript if necessary for the defendant’s appeal to be heard). 
 62. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967). More recently, the Court has held that 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims can be made based on the plea-bargaining process. See 
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 148 (2012) (holding that defense attorneys have a duty to convey 
plea bargain offers to defendants); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 163–64 (2012) (finding that the 
prosecutor might be required to reoffer a plea if the defendant originally rejected it due to 
ineffective assistance of counsel). 
 63. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (holding that assistance of counsel is necessary for 
juveniles to navigate legal proceedings).  
 64. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 
654, 654 (2002) (holding that a suspended prison sentence may not be imposed if the defendant 
lacked an attorney at trial); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (clarifying that the right to 
counsel is required whenever a defendant was actually sentenced to prison, but not if a prison 
sentence was merely authorized under the charging statute); Shaun Ossei-Owusu, The Sixth 
Amendment Façade: The Racial Evolution of the Right to Counsel, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1161, 1164 
(2019) (“During this decade, which saw larger criminal procedure reforms, the Court had the most 
generous approach toward indigent defense.”). 
 65. Henry P. Monaghan, Gideon’s Army: Student Soldiers, 45 B.U. L. REV. 445, 446 (1965). 
 66. GIDEON’S TRUMPET (Worldvision Enterprises 1980).  
SUKHATME IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/16/2020  1:35 AM 
2021] PAY TO PLAY? 789 
assigned or the requisite quality of such counsel.67 Nor did it define 
what states must do to ensure this type of counsel is available for 
indigent defendants.68 Put differently, Gideon gave states considerable 
freedom to shirk the large unfunded mandate the case had created.69 
These issues were exacerbated by subsequent Court decisions, 
perhaps most notably by Strickland v. Washington.70 There, the Court 
determined that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel can succeed 
only if there were an initial determination that a defense attorney’s 
performance was so lacking “that counsel was not functioning as the 
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”71 
Moreover, the defendant must show the ineffectiveness prejudiced him 
so severely that there is a reasonable possibility that the outcome of 
the defendant’s case would have been different without the deficient 
performance of counsel.72 
Justice Thurgood Marshall noted in his Strickland dissent that this 
exacting standard would be hard to meet, since “it is often very difficult 
to tell whether a defendant convicted after a trial in which he was 
ineffectively represented would have fared better if his lawyer had 
been competent.”73 And he was right. Though defendants regularly 
make ineffective assistance of counsel claims, they rarely succeed.74 
 
 67. Cf. Bright & Sanneh, supra note 17, at 2160 (“Fifty years after Gideon, the right to 
counsel and equal justice are as much a fiction as the adversary system. The kind of justice people 
receive depends very much on the amount of money they have.”).  
 68. See id. at 2154 (“The Supreme Court has refused to require competent representation, 
instead adopting a standard of ‘effective counsel’ that hides and perpetuates deficient 
representation.”).  
 69. Id. at 2153 (“[M]ost states, counties, and municipalities—responsible for over ninety-five 
percent of all criminal prosecutions—have refused to provide funding necessary for counsel and 
equal justice, despite repeated reports of deficient representation and gross miscarriages of 
justice.”). 
 70. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 71. Id. at 687. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 74. A 2013 analysis found that the Supreme Court has virtually never found ineffective 
assistance of counsel since Strickland. See Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 2689. Professor Erwin 
Chemerinsky identified just two Supreme Court findings of ineffective assistance of counsel at 
trial in the twenty-five years following Gideon—Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), and 
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005), both capital cases. Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 2689. 
He also noted that the findings in Wiggins and Rompilla were called into question by the Court’s 
ruling in Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011), which held that evidence of ineffective 
assistance of counsel could not be presented at federal habeas proceedings. Id. at 181–85; 
Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 2689–90; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 356 (2010) 
(holding that criminal defense attorneys must inform non-citizen defendants of the potential 
deportation consequences of guilty pleas). 
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The end result is that indigent defendants might get stuck with counsel 
who are not constitutionally ineffective, but whom paying clients would 
never select.75 
With ineffective assistance claims largely rendered futile, some 
sought to remedy the dramatic underfunding of indigent defense 
through systemic, structural litigation.76 But the potential for such 
federal litigation was limited, as federal courts relied on the abstention 
doctrine to avoid intervening in ongoing state cases.77 Structural 
litigation in state courts was similarly unsuccessful, with courts 
demanding a showing of prejudice or the existence of a conflict on an 
individual case-by-case basis from public defenders seeking to remedy 
funding disparities.78 The heightened evidentiary requirements have 
limited the number of structural indigent defense litigation suits in 
state courts, with one scholar stating, “It is estimated that no more than 
ten of these suits were filed between 1980 and 2000.”79 
Gideon’s failures are also often attributed to underlying power 
dynamics and political considerations that adversely affect indigent 
defendants.80 In particular, scholars point to asymmetries in monetary 
support and available resources for prosecutors and indigent defense 
counsel.81 Prosecutors work closely with law enforcement agencies, 
whose job is to investigate in support of prosecution; defense counsel 
are instead left to fend for themselves should they desire to investigate 
 
 75. As one private criminal defense firm in Texas colorfully (and perhaps self-servingly) 
noted on its website, “If you’re appointed a lawyer in a criminal case in Texas, your court-
appointed lawyer may be an incompetent hack, or he may be a truly outstanding 
attorney . . . . [P]eople are almost always happier when they have counsel of their choice than 
when they have counsel thrust upon them.” See Court-Appointed Lawyers, BENNETT & BENNETT 
(June 16, 2019, 2:56 PM), https://bennettandbennett.com/about/court-appointed-lawyers [https://
perma.cc/ZZF9-ED7Y]. 
 76. Cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 2687 (“There have been many challenges to the 
inadequacy of the system of providing criminal representation within a jurisdiction.”).  
 77. Id.; see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–54 (1971) (discussing why federal courts 
abstain from issuing rulings that interfere with ongoing state criminal prosecutions); Margaret A. 
Costello, Fulfilling the Unfulfilled Promise of Gideon: Litigation as a Viable Strategic Tool, 99 
IOWA L. REV. 1951, 1962 (2014); Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense 
Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 438–43 (2009). 
 78. See Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 2687 (citing Florida v. Pub. Def., 12 So. 3d 798 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2009)). 
 79. See Drinan, supra note 77, at 431. 
 80. See, e.g., Bright & Sanneh, supra note 17, at 2156 (“Prosecutors have vast resources and 
immense power in conducting their inquests and dictating outcomes in the plea bargaining that 
resolves the overwhelming majority of cases.”); id. at 2160 (“Prosecutors evaluate cases not as 
objective inquisitors, but as adversaries and politicians.”).  
 81. See id. at 2156–57.  
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on behalf of their clients.82 Prosecutors are afforded large budgets 
dedicated to investigation; indigent defense attorneys are rarely (if 
ever) granted such a luxury.83 And some judges rely heavily—perhaps 
inappropriately—on prosecutors, following their recommendations 
and even asking prosecutors to write orders for them,84 a benefit rarely 
accorded to counsel advocating on behalf of indigent defendants. 
The politics of mass incarceration in the decades following Gideon 
have further entrenched the built-in advantages that prosecutors enjoy 
over defense counsel. Though America’s criminal justice system only 
moderately increased in size in the 1960s and 1970s, the tough-on-crime 
1980s and 1990s created a system with a higher incarceration rate than 
any other industrialized nation.85 The demand for indigent defense 
likewise exploded,86 financially straining a system that was already 
starved for resources. 
The political battle for indigent defense resources, pitting popular 
tough-on-crime policies against poor people accused of crimes, was 
unsurprisingly one-sided. According to one scholar discussing capital 
defendants: “The individuals adversely affected by this crisis—those 
accused of aggravated murder—are the most hated and least politically 
powerful in the country, and political actors, including judges, are not 
highly motivated to make unpopular decisions that would benefit 
them.”87 With political considerations weighing heaviest on publicly 
elected prosecutors and judges, there was little to gain professionally 
from insisting on a level playing field.88 
 
 82. Id. at 2156. Moreover, discovery is limited in criminal cases, so defendants are also 
limited in terms of what information they can obtain from prosecutors and what prosecutors are 
obligated to disclose to defendants. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 83. Bright & Sanneh, supra note 17, at 2156. 
 84. Id.  
 85. See Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 2686 (citing MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM 
CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012)). 
 86. Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United 
States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 31 (1995). 
 87. Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and 
Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 459 (1995). 
 88. See Bright & Sanneh, supra note 17, at 2160 (noting many prosecutors are elected on 
tough-on-crime platforms); id. at 2171 (stating state court judges are often elected). Some 
scholarly critiques of Gideon also focus on its impact on other criminal procedural rights. See 
Justin F. Marceau, Gideon’s Shadow, 122 YALE L.J. 2482, 2484 (2013) (arguing Gideon has been 
used as a cudgel to curb other procedural rights); Metzger, supra note 16, at 2552–59 
(demonstrating how Gideon and Strickland have weakened the adversarial process). Others have 
focused on Gideon’s failure to adequately protect Black defendants. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 
18, at 2236 (arguing the Gideon Court failed to directly address racial discrimination, and this 
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II.  THE INCENTIVE GAP IN THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL  
The long history of the right to counsel is largely defined by false 
hopes and unmet expectations. And, as is commonly argued, 
inadequate funding, tepid political support, and the practical inability 
of defendants to succeed on most ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims are important reasons why indigent defense has not evolved the 
way many advocates hoped it would after Gideon. 
But indigent defense in America does not just suffer from a lack 
of money or a lack of political support—it also suffers from poor 
design.89 Indeed, most indigent defense systems are built on shaky 
foundations that put publicly funded defense attorneys at odds with 
those they represent. This incentive gap, in turn, adversely affects the 
legal representation these defendants receive.90 
This Part explores this dynamic. It begins by summarizing the 
different models of indigent defense adopted by various jurisdictions 
and then discusses how they distort attorney incentives in different 
ways. It also explains how the relationship between judges and defense 
attorneys—mediated through the mechanism of campaign finance—
exacerbates the incentive gap, thereby further adversely impacting the 
provision of indigent defense. 
A. Background on Indigent Defense Systems 
Gideon and its progeny famously failed to direct states on how to 
provide counsel to poor defendants, thereby giving them substantial 
latitude in crafting indigent defense systems. States are fairly evenly 
 
failure portended larger failures to protect the rights of African Americans subject to the Jim 
Crow system of criminal justice). Still others suggest Gideon might actually be counterproductive 
to the plight of the poor in the justice system. See Butler, supra note 19, at 2178 (“Poor people 
lose, most of the time, because in American criminal justice, poor people are losers. Prison is 
designed for them. This is the real crisis of indigent defense. Gideon obscures this reality, and in 
this sense stands in the way of the political mobilization . . . .”); see also John H. Blume & Sheri 
Lynn Johnson, Gideon Exceptionalism?, 122 YALE L.J. 2126, 2129 (2013) (attempting to reconcile 
the state of indigent defense in America with the general reverence for Gideon by declaring it to 
be “both a ‘shining city on a hill’ . . . [and] a sham”). 
 89. Of course, these phenomena might be interrelated—for example, some poor design 
choices in indigent defense systems might be deliberately made by those looking to render the 
system impotent. And a lack of funding is one way to make sure that poor design leads to worse 
outcomes. 
 90. A rare article that examines how assigned counsel incentives are affected by payment 
systems is Benjamin Schwall, More Bang for Your Buck: How To Improve the Incentive Structure 
for Indigent Defense Counsel, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 553 (2017). 
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split between administering indigent defense at the local (usually 
county) level or at the state level.91 
Jurisdictions also are split among three different models of 
representation: assigned counsel, contract, and public defender.92 Each 
of these models is commonly used in the United States. Public defender 
systems are utilized most often in larger cities, whereas assigned 
counsel systems are used in more jurisdictions overall, particularly in 
rural parts of the country.93 Each of these systems is described below. 
1. Assigned Counsel.  Assigned counsel systems rely on private 
attorneys to represent indigent defendants.94 The oldest model is an ad 
hoc assigned counsel system,95 where “appointment of counsel is 
generally made by the court, without benefit of a formal list or rotation 
method and without specific qualification criteria for attorneys.”96 
Popular in smaller, more rural jurisdictions, ad hoc assigned counsel 
systems are “frequently criticized for fostering patronage and lacking 
control over the experience level and qualifications of the appointed 
attorneys.”97 
Other iterations of assigned counsel systems address some, but not 
all, of the ad hoc model’s shortcomings. One such system is sometimes 
referred to as the wheel system, in which “private attorneys, acting as 
independent contractors and compensated with public funds, are 
individually appointed from a public appointment list of qualified 
attorneys using a system of rotation to provide legal representation and 
services to a particular indigent defendant accused of a crime or 
juvenile offense.”98 Wheel and ad hoc assigned counsel systems 
 
 91. See SUZANNE M. STRONG, STATE-ADMINISTERED INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, 2013, 
at 1 (2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/saids13.pdf [https://perma.cc/BYU8-28DL] (“In 
2013, 28 states and the District of Columbia had state-administered indigent defense programs 
for the delivery of criminal defense services.”). 
 92. Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 86, at 32. 
 93. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, DEFENSE 
COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 4–5 & tbls. 5–6 (2000), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
dccc.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PAM-L35H]. 
 94. Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 86, at 32. 
 95. Id. at 33.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. 
 98. TEX. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, PRIMER ON MANAGED ASSIGNED COUNSEL PROGRAMS 
3 (2017) [hereinafter TEX. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, PRIMER], http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/
8d87ba4edab9eb1/managed-assigned-counsel-primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9GV-2W96]. As 
discussed in more detail below, Harris County, where we conducted our empirical analysis, is 
supposed to be a wheel jurisdiction. See TONY FABELO, CARL REYNOLDS & JESSICA TYLER, 
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generally require attorneys to petition the court for any case-related 
expenses, including funds for investigation, expert witnesses, and other 
litigation costs.99 These expenses often require prior approval from the 
court and are limited by a maximum, court-determined payout.100  
The last distinct form of an assigned counsel system is known as a 
managed or coordinated assigned counsel program. Rather than let the 
judge select an indigent defense attorney, this decision is left to an 
independent body such as “[a] governmental entity, nonprofit 
corporation, or bar association operating under a written agreement 
with a county for the purpose of appointing counsel to indigent 
defendants.”101 These are the rarest assigned counsel systems,102 
perhaps due to the additional administrative burdens that accompany 
them. 
2. Contract Attorneys.  Contract programs differ from assigned 
counsel systems in that the jurisdiction “enters into contracts with 
private attorneys, law firms, bar associations, or non-profit 
organizations to provide representation to indigent defendants.”103 
Still, in practice, many modern contract systems operate like assigned 
counsel systems, the most significant difference being that there is no 
rotation requirement among attorneys in a contract system.104 
An early model of contract attorney systems is the fixed-price 
contract model, where “the contracting lawyer, law firm, or bar 
association agrees to accept an undetermined number of cases within 
an agreed upon contract period . . . for a single flat fee.”105 In a fixed-
price contract model, the contracting entities are responsible for the 
cost of investigation and expert witnesses in all cases, even if the 
caseload in the jurisdiction is higher than expected for the term of the 
contract.106 Fixed-price contract models are frequently faulted for their 
 
IMPROVING INDIGENT DEFENSE: EVALUATION OF THE HARRIS COUNTY PUBLIC 
DEFENDER 12 (2013) [hereinafter FABELO ET AL., IMPROVING INDIGENT DEFENSE], http://
harriscountypublicdefender.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/JCHCPDFinalReport.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/RS7U-JGBJ] (“Harris County relies primarily on appointments from the ‘wheel’ of 
eligible attorneys to provide counsel for indigents, in an ‘assigned counsel’ system.”).  
 99. Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 86, at 33.  
 100. Id.  
 101. TEX. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, PRIMER, supra note 98, at 3. 
 102. Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 86, at 33.  
 103. Id. at 34.  
 104. See TEX. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, PRIMER, supra note 98, at 4.  
 105. Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 86, at 34. 
 106. Id. 
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failure to take into account the time that the attorney is expected to 
spend representing indigent clients, the competency of the attorney, 
the complexity of the case, or the lack of support costs provided to the 
attorney.107 
Another older model of contract attorney program is known as 
the fixed-fee-per-case contract model, in which lawyers are paid by the 
case rather than contracting to provide an unlimited number of cases 
for a flat fee.108 In this model, funds for investigation, expert witnesses, 
and support services are all included in the contract.109 Just as with the 
fixed price model, many criticize the fixed-fee-per-case model for its 
lack of quality control.110 Nonetheless, jurisdictions often overlook the 
shaky legal and ethical footings of a contract attorney system to reap 
the benefit of projecting costs by limiting the amount of money 
apportioned in each contract.111  
3. Public Defenders.  Finally, public defender systems are probably 
the best-known model of indigent defense provision. Such systems 
employ staff attorneys who are paid a fixed salary to provide 
representation to poor defendants.112 More precisely, a public defender 
system is often defined as “a governmental entity or nonprofit 
corporation that: 1) operates under written agreement with a county 
rather than an individual judge or court; 2) uses public funds; and 3) 
provides legal representation and services to indigent defendants 
accused of a crime or juvenile offense.”113 
The first public defender program started in Los Angeles in 1913, 
but the model did not gain widespread popularity until national studies 
published in the 1970s supported this approach.114 Unfortunately, the 
increased demand for indigent defense services beginning in the 1980s 
means that many public defenders now carry overwhelmingly large 
caseloads, often resulting in ineffective representation.115 
 
 107. Id. (citing State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984)). In State v. Smith, the Arizona 
Supreme Court found that the fixed-price contract models used in several Arizona counties were 
unconstitutional. 681 P.2d at 1381. 
 108. Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 86, at 34. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id. at 35.  
 111. See id. 
 112. Id. at 36.  
 113. TEX. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, PRIMER, supra note 98, at 3. 
 114. Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 86, at 36. 
 115. Id. at 36–37. 
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Some jurisdictions use public defenders alongside assigned 
counsel or contract attorneys.116 This might be, for example, because 
there are insufficient numbers of public defenders who are able to 
handle the flow of indigent defense cases. In some instances, public 
defenders handle only a small fraction of such cases. As discussed in 
more detail below, Harris County, Texas, is one such jurisdiction.117 
B. Different Systems, Different Incentives 
Apart from being poor, typically young, and male, indigent 
defendants differ from one another in terms of their race, background, 
criminal history, employment and family status, and risk preference, as 
well as the crimes for which they are charged. Still, most defendants, 
whether poor or not, invariably share some predictable goals. Clearly, 
most would like to avoid a criminal conviction and punishment. Failing 
that, most want to minimize any punishment they receive, whether in 
terms of prison, probation, or fines. And like most people, indigent 
defendants would like to avoid pretrial detention regardless of the 
outcome. 
Defense attorneys who represent indigent defendants also share 
some predictable goals. Some of those goals might align with those of 
their clients—for example, a desire to win a case or to vindicate the 
rights of the innocent who are wrongfully accused of a crime. Other 
goals, however, might not be so compatible. This, in turn, might open 
up an incentive gap that causes attorneys to behave in ways that are 
detrimental to their clients. 
This incentive gap is shaped by the particular indigent defense 
system in which attorneys operate.118 As such, how this system is 
designed might affect, among other things: how many cases attorneys 
choose to take on; how much time and resources attorneys spend on 
each case they are assigned; when and whether an attorney 
recommends settling a case to a client and on what terms; and the 
quality of lawyer who chooses to participate in such a system in the first 
 
 116. See, e.g., James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer 
Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154, 161 (2012) 
(discussing that one in five murder defendants in Philadelphia were randomly assigned a public 
defender and the rest received assigned counsel).  
 117. Infra Part III.A.2. 
 118. See Schwall, supra note 90, at 553 (recognizing that “[t]he payment system and related 
incentive structure can have a major effect on an attorney’s behavior, and this impact is somewhat 
predictable”). 
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place. We explore these issues in more detail below, examining how 
these incentives operate within each model of indigent defense. 
1. Caseload Incentives for Assigned Counsel and Contract 
Attorneys.  First, and perhaps most importantly, the design of an 
indigent defense system can affect attorneys’ incentives when it comes 
to the size of their caseloads. In all assigned counsel and many contract 
attorney systems, payments to an attorney typically bear some relation 
to the number of cases the attorney is assigned. The payment might be 
a flat fee for each case that is assigned, a flat fee for each court 
appearance or day worked, or an hourly fee for time worked on a 
case.119 Such systems often include caps on the maximum amount an 
attorney can be paid on a particular matter.120 
Consider first a jurisdiction in which an attorney is paid a flat fee 
for each case she is assigned, as is done in some assigned counsel and 
contract attorney systems.121 If the flat fee is too low to justify taking a 
case—for example, if the attorney has more profitable ways to spend 
her time—then the attorney will choose not to take the case. But if the 
flat fee is large enough, the attorney will be incentivized to take on a 
large number of cases, since each case adds revenue without 
significantly increasing costs.122 By contrast, working more intensely on 
any one particular case gives the attorney no additional revenue, since 
compensation is fixed regardless of the effort expended or outcome 
achieved. Thus, paying attorneys a flat fee per case might push them 
toward large caseloads for which they exert little effort on any one case. 
In addition, these attorneys might settle cases quickly, since additional 
time spent on a case is just wasted from a financial perspective. 
 
 119. See Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 86, at 33 (explaining that in the ad hoc assigned 
counsel program, attorneys are usually paid on an hourly basis, and in some states, attorneys are 
provided a flat fee per case); id. at 34 (discussing fixed-fee-per-case contracts).  
 120. See JANET RENO, DANIEL MARCUS, MARY LOU LEARY & NANCY E. GIST, 
CONTRACTING FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES: A SPECIAL REPORT 4 (2000), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/181160.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3H6-2C58]. 
 121. In this example, and the others that follow, assume that the underlying cases are 
otherwise identical and that an attorney is motivated largely, if not exclusively, by financial gain. 
That is, the attorney seeks to maximize the total revenue she earns net of costs across all indigent 
defense cases she takes on. Attorneys in the real world are, of course, not so one-dimensional; 
nonetheless, our empirical analysis suggests attorneys do respond to financial incentives, 
indicating the profit motive is an important determinant of attorney behavior.  
 122. This assumes the cost of working on a case goes up linearly as well; if costs increase in a 
non-linear manner, then the attorney will eventually reach a point where adding an additional 
case will be more costly than the revenue she earns from it. The general point still holds, however, 
that the attorney will have an incentive to take on more cases until she reaches that point. 
SUKHATME IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/16/2020  1:35 AM 
798  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:775 
Note the paradox that emerges here. On the surface, it might seem 
that the large number of cases assigned to these attorneys is the 
primary reason why they are unable to spend much time or exert much 
effort on any one case. But the real reason these attorneys are 
overextended is that they have chosen to accept an overload of cases in 
the first place. In this setting, it is not the lack of funds but the poor 
design of the indigent defense system itself that is driving the 
dysfunction. 
Although the per-case payment scheme might be an obvious 
example of how a large incentive gap might open up between attorney 
and client, other payment schemes distort incentives in less obvious 
ways. For example, consider when attorneys are paid based on the 
number of days they spend on a case. This is how assigned counsel in 
Harris County are paid,123 as demonstrated in a fee table for an actual 
case, shown in Appendix Figure A.1. There, we can see the attorney 
was paid $125 a day for each court appearance, regardless of how long 
he actually spent in court on the case itself, or how many other cases 
he might have handled on those same days. Those five court 
appearances entitled the attorney to a total of $625 in attorney’s fees.  
At first glance, a pay-per-day system might seem to benefit clients, 
since an attorney has an incentive to spend many days on each case, 
thereby increasing total wages. But this is likely incorrect for at least 
two reasons. 
First, like the system where attorneys are paid by the case, 
attorneys under this system still earn more money if they maximize the 
number of cases they take on. This once again leads to concerns about 
defense attorneys choosing to accept an excessive workload. 
Second, a daily payment system encourages attorneys to “touch” 
as many case files as possible in a single day to ensure they are eligible 
to be paid for that day. But the amount of work they spent on each case 
might be minimal. The optimal strategy for an attorney seeking to 
maximize revenues and to minimize effort is to do barely any work on 
a case on any given day, but to spread this minimal work out over many 
days. Again, this does not work to the benefit of indigent defendants. 
 
 123. See HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT COURTS TRYING CRIMINAL CASES FAIR DEFENSE ACT 
ALTERNATIVE PLAN FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL TO INDIGENT DEFENDANTS: FEE 
SCHEDULE 2–3 (last updated Mar. 2019), http://tidc.tamu.edu/IDPlanDocuments/Harris/
Harris%20District%20Court%20Attorney%20Fee%20Schedule.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQ86-
B5HJ] (explaining that for non-capital, post-conviction proceedings, or argument in the court of 
criminal appeals, all district courts pay per court appearance or per court appearance plus out-of-
court hours with presumptive maximums).  
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In fact, it could even be detrimental to a defendant who is incarcerated 
while awaiting trial. Not only does the attorney have little incentive to 
spend quality time on a defendant’s case, but now she has an incentive 
to drag the case out while her client languishes in jail. 
An hourly payment system seems preferable to these two 
alternatives. In an hourly system, an attorney is paid based on the 
amount of time she spends on a case. At first glance, there is no 
incentive to take on more cases—an attorney can spend more time on 
the same case and earn the same marginal revenue as she would by 
taking on a new one.124 It might even be better for an attorney to work 
more on an existing case, since there are fixed costs in picking up a new 
matter that might make it more onerous than working an additional 
hour on a case with which she is already familiar. 
However, in practice, this system also has problems. Although in 
theory an hourly system would incentivize attorneys to put in more 
effort on a particular case, there are typically caps on what attorneys 
can charge per case.125 Once an attorney reaches that cap, she has little 
incentive to put in more work on that case and instead gains more 
revenue by seeking out fresh cases. Hence, defense attorneys in 
assigned counsel systems still are incentivized to maximize their 
caseloads even when they are paid by the hour. 
2. Caseload Incentives for Public Defenders.  One might view these 
distortions as proof that the best way to provide indigent defense is 
through a pure public defender system. Unlike assigned counsel 
systems, public defender salaries do not depend on the number of cases 
they are assigned.126 Thus, from a financial perspective, there is no 
incentive to take on an excessive number of cases. And there is some 
 
 124. Some empirical evidence supports this point. See Schwall, supra note 90, at 554 (showing 
that South Carolina attorneys reported working fifty percent less hours after the state shifted from 
hourly payments to a flat-fee system). 
 125. See, e.g., CRIM. JUST. GUIDELINES § 230.16 (2019) (setting a maximum hourly rate for 
appointed counsel in federal non-capital cases); id. § 230.23.20 (setting case maximums for same 
set of cases).  
 126. See NORMAN LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN 
PUBLIC DEFENSE 11 (2011), https://www.in.gov/publicdefender/files/SecuringReasonable
Caseloads.Book.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JCV-PZLB] (“The public defender model employs 
salaried full-time or part-time lawyers.”); e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-14-207 (1989) (mandating 
that public defender compensation is calculated based on years of practice).  
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empirical evidence suggesting public defenders do, in fact, outperform 
assigned counsel in terms of outcomes for criminal defendants.127 
Unfortunately, public defenders must deal with a different set of 
forces that also push their incentives away from those of their clients. 
Though public defenders have no financial incentive to take on 
additional cases, they often have little control over the number of cases 
they are assigned.128 If a public defender’s office is understaffed—as is 
invariably true across the United States129—then the supply of public 
defenders is insufficient to meet the influx of indigent criminal 
defendants who need representation.130 Faced with a flood of cases, 
public defenders are forced to apportion their limited time among 
 
 127. See Anderson & Heaton, supra note 116, at 154 (exploiting the random assignment of 
indigent murder defendants in Philadelphia to public defenders or court appointed private 
attorneys and finding public defenders “reduce their clients’ murder conviction rate by 19% and 
lower the probability that their clients receive a life sentence by 62%,” as well as “reduc[ing] 
overall expected time served in prison by 24%”); Radha Iyengar, An Analysis of the Performance 
of Federal Indigent Defense Counsel 11–15 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 13187, 
2007), https://www.nber.org/papers/w13187 [https://perma.cc/C726-7RD5] (exploiting random 
case assignments to determine that salaried federal public defenders outperform appointed, 
hourly compensated private counsel in terms of conviction rates and sentence lengths); see also 
FABELO ET AL., IMPROVING INDIGENT DEFENSE, supra note 98, at 2 (finding that the Harris 
County Public Defender’s office delivered better defense outcomes than assigned counsel); David 
S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using Random Case Assignment To 
Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (2007) (exploiting random assignments 
in Las Vegas, Nevada, and finding that being assigned a “veteran public defender with ten years 
of experience reduces the average length of incarceration by 17% relative to a public defender in 
her first year”). 
 128. See LEFSTEIN, supra note 126, at 20 (noting the majority of courts still appoint lawyers 
to represent indigent persons, and that “[w]hile the ethical duty to avoid excessive caseloads is 
clear, defense lawyers and heads of defender programs often are reluctant to seek to avoid court 
appointments or to withdraw from cases to which they have been appointed”). For an overview 
of reasons that keep public defenders from turning down cases, see generally John P. Gross, Case 
Refusal: A Right for the Public Defender but Not a Remedy for the Defendant, 95 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 253, 256–59 (2017).  
 129. See The Sad State of the Public Defender in America, FRED DAHR, https://
www.texasdefenselaw.com/library/sad-state-public-defender-america [https://perma.cc/67P2-
VL5E].  
 130. See, e.g., LEFSTEIN, supra note 126, at 17 (describing a witness from Pennsylvania who 
told an American Bar Association (“ABA”) committee that a county “had 4172 cases in 1980 but 
that the number of cases had grown to 8000 in 2000 without any growth in the staff size of the 
public defender’s office” (citing ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT 
DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL 
JUSTICE 18 (2004) [hereinafter GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE], http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_ 
in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VBS-75RG])).  
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them.131 And once again, that creates pressure to dispose of cases 
quickly—or at least quicker and with less substantive investigation than 
if time were not a worry.132 
Commentators and scholars have noticed that public defenders 
are not immune from these time pressures.133 The American Bar 
Association (“ABA”) has addressed the issue head on,134 stating that 
“defender organizations, individual defenders, assigned counsel or 
contractors for services . . . must take such steps as may be appropriate 
to reduce their pending or projected caseloads, including the refusal of 
further appointments” when accepting new cases or continuing with 
old cases would “lead to the furnishing of representation lacking in 
quality or to the breach of professional obligations.”135 
3. Caseload Incentives for Private Attorneys.  Now contrast the 
incentives of publicly funded attorneys with those of private 
attorneys—lawyers who represent private-paying clients. The two 
primary models by which private attorneys are paid are up-front fees 
 
 131. See id. at 16–17 (detailing the disconnect between the amount of time public defenders 
have to work on cases and the amount of work and time required for these cases); see also 
Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 86, at 36–37 (“[J]urisdictions with public defender programs 
have not allotted sufficient resources to keep pace with the ever-expanding caseload. The result 
has been that public defender staff attorneys are often asked to carry caseloads that make it 
difficult, if not impossible, to provide effective representation.”). For an eye-opening discussion 
on the problems facing public defender’s offices nationwide, watch John Oliver, Last Week 
Tonight with John Oliver: Public Defenders, YOUTUBE (Sept. 13, 2015), https://youtu.be/
USkEzLuzmZ4 [https://perma.cc/EJ96-NANQ]. 
 132. Worse, some argue that given this excessive caseload, implicit bias may cause public 
defenders to “triage” their caseload in ways that hurt stigmatized groups, such as Black 
defendants. See L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender 
Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2628 (2013). 
 133. Professor David Luban vividly captures the setting in which most public defenders and 
panel attorneys operate: 
a world of lawyers for whom no defense at all, rather than aggressive defense or even 
desultory defense, is the norm; a world of minuscule acquittal rates; a world where 
advocacy is rare and defense investigation virtually nonexistent; a world where lawyers 
spend minutes, rather than hours, with their clients; a world in which individualized 
scrutiny is replaced by the indifferent mass-processing of interchangeable defendants. 
David Luban, Are Criminal Defendants Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1762 (1993). 
 134. See LEFSTEIN, supra note 126, at 37–43 (discussing ABA recommendations regarding the 
overwhelming caseloads of public defenders). 
 135. See id. at 37 (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE 
SERVICES, Std. 5-5 (2d ed. 1980)). The ABA intentionally used the word “must” in referring to 
the need to take appropriate action when caseloads become excessive, rather than the word 
“should,” which is used for all of the remaining standards from the same chapter. Id. at 38. ABA 
Standard 5-5 has largely remained unchanged since it was first issued in 1980, though it might be 
revisited in future ABA releases. Id. at 37. 
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and retainers.136 In an up-front fee system, the attorney asks a 
prospective client to prepay for criminal defense representation. In a 
retainer system, the client pays money up front into escrow. The funds 
are deducted from the account and transferred to the attorney as she 
racks up hours on the defendant’s case.  
The prepayment model is like the per-case payment model 
described for assigned counsel. Hence, private counsel has an incentive 
to take on a large number of cases just like assigned counsel do in that 
setting. The retainer model does not include this kind of distortion, 
since the attorney is paid for each hour worked regardless of which case 
she works on.137  
Private attorneys, like most assigned counsel, have significant 
control over the number of cases they accept. But unlike assigned 
counsel, private attorneys do not face the same financial incentives to 
take on an overwhelming number of cases. This is because private 
attorneys typically operate in a market with other competing defense 
attorneys. 
If a private attorney fleeces a client, or attains bad results for him, 
this might adversely affect her reputation and future clients might be 
less likely to hire that attorney.138 To the extent the market serves as a 
disciplining force, it constrains private attorneys from acting too far out 
of line with their clients’ interests. Because attorneys who are 
overloaded cannot represent their clients as effectively as those who 
are not, this market force at least in theory constrains the number of 
cases that private attorneys are likely to take on.139 
 
 136. See Sara J. Berman, Paying a Private Criminal Defense Attorney, NOLO, https://
www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/paying-private-criminal-defense-attorney.html [https://5YBU- 
QG7N].  
 137. Of course, the attorney might have an incentive to overcharge in this setting by working 
maximally on the easiest tasks, thereby minimizing effort but maximizing revenue. 
 138. This dynamic might be even greater today than in years past, since websites like 
Avvo.com include detailed client reviews of criminal defense attorneys. Numerous instances of 
bad client reviews are swiftly met by explanations or mea culpas by the offending attorney. Like 
Yelp reviews for restaurants, one credible bad review can be devastating for business. 
 139. Since private criminal defense attorneys typically earn higher wages than publicly funded 
defense counsel, the former might choose to substitute more leisure time for work relative to the 
latter. See How Much Do Criminal Lawyers Make?, INDEED (Feb. 25, 2020), https://
www.indeed.com/career-advice/pay-salary/criminal-lawyer-salary [https://perma.cc/KET3-9766] 
(stating that the national average salary for a public defender is $60,839 per year, whereas the 
national average salary for a private defense attorney is $89,961 per year). On the other hand, if 
their demand for leisure increases as they get richer, which seems likely, then this off-setting 
“income effect” might lower the number of cases they choose to take on. Put in simple terms, if 
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By contrast, no such market force exists to discipline counsel in 
indigent defense cases, whether assigned, contract, or public defender. 
Because indigent defendants do not select their own lawyers, they are 
typically at the whim of whomever is chosen by a court or independent 
body as their representative. And, as demonstrated below, that choice 
might not be random, but instead determined based on financial forces 
that have little regard for a defendant’s well-being or best interests. 
III.  THE INCENTIVE GAP AND JUDICIAL PAY TO PLAY:  
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND 
INDIGENT DEFENSE IN HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS 
In this Part, we provide empirical support for the claim that 
campaign finance exacerbates the incentive gap in the right to counsel. 
Using detailed data from Harris County, we empirically analyze the 
relationship between attorney donations to elected judges and 
appointments to indigent defense cases. Our results are strongly 
consistent with qualitative evidence that we also present: judges 
appoint their donors to a disproportionate number of cases, consistent 
with a system in which pay to play regularly occurs. Moreover, if 
anything, donor attorneys appear to underperform for their clients 
relative to non-donors, even after controlling for case and defendant 
characteristics. 
This Part begins by explaining in detail how judicial elections and 
court appointments work in Harris County. Next, it describes how we 
constructed our linked dataset, which is the first large-scale dataset that 
connects criminal court data with donations to trial court judges. 
Finally, this Part analyzes the data and presents evidence of pay to play 
in indigent defense.  
A. Background and Qualitative Evidence on Judicial Pay to Play in 
Harris County 
1. Courts and Judicial Elections.  The state of Texas has 254 
counties, more than any other state.140 This translates into 252 county 
courts of law that primarily handle misdemeanor offenses141 and 472 
 
private attorneys are earning high enough wages, they might decide it is not worth it to take on 
an excessive number of cases even though they could earn more by doing so. 
 140. FABELO ET AL., IMPROVING INDIGENT DEFENSE, supra note 98, at 9.  
 141. TEX. OFF. OF CT. ADMIN., COUNTIES WITH COUNTY COURTS AT LAW 1 (2019), https://
www.txcourts.gov/media/1444575/countycourtsatlaw_september2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8G7-
U8RX]; TEX. CTS., COURT STRUCTURE OF TEXAS 1 (2019) [hereinafter TEXAS CTS., COURT 
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district courts for felony offenses.142 Texas’s court system is said to be 
“designed to discourage the accumulation of power,”143 resulting in a 
system with “numerous elected officials at every level, for every 
branch, [that has] shaped the state’s unstructured approach to indigent 
defense.”144 
Our data come from Harris County, home to over 4.71 million 
people145 and the third most populous county in the United States.146 
The county comprises all of the city of Houston and a few major 
suburbs. Here we focus on the sixty district criminal courts located in 
Harris County,147 which handle all state felony cases. 
Like all judges in Texas,148 Harris County district judges are 
elected. They serve four-year terms,149 with roughly half elected in the 
November of off-presidential election years and the other half elected 
in the November of presidential election years.150 District judges take 
office on January 1 of the year following an election. 
Typically, judicial elections in Harris County are not uncontested. 
Rather, there is a party primary followed by a partisan general election, 
where one Democrat runs against one Republican. In the early 2000s, 
Republicans controlled most of the judicial seats in Harris County. 
Beginning in 2008, however, Democrats found more electoral success 
in judicial elections as the county shifted politically toward the left.151 
 
STRUCTURE], http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1443399/court-structure-chart-jan-2019.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/S774-PWY5] (noting that Texas county-level courts handle misdemeanors punishable 
by confinement).  
 142. TEX. CTS., COURT STRUCTURE, supra note 141. 
 143. FABELO ET AL., IMPROVING INDIGENT DEFENSE, supra note 98, at 9. 
 144. Id.  
 145. See QuickFacts, Harris County, Texas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/harriscountytexas [https://perma.cc/9F66-R5M7] (stating that the estimated 
population of Harris County as of July 1, 2019, is 4,713,325). 
 146. FABELO ET AL., IMPROVING INDIGENT DEFENSE, supra note 98, at 11.  
 147. TEX. CTS., STATE DISTRICT COURTS 1 (2019), https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1445220/
district-court-map-october-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/33BW-P2HJ].  
 148. Texas has had partisan election of judges at all levels of courts since 1876. Judicial 
Selection in the States: Texas, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS. [hereinafter Judicial Selection], http://
www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=TX [https://perma.cc/44H4-25E6].  
 149. See id. 
 150. Election Results, HARRIS CNTY. CLERK, https://www.harrisvotes.com/Election
Results?lang=en-US [https://perma.cc/E7P7-6T7W]. 
 151. Based on data we compiled from the Harris County Clerk website, see id., we found that 
out of 37 district court elections between 2002 and 2006, all 37 were won by Republican 
candidates. By contrast, out of 53 district court elections between 2008 and 2016, (about 37.7 
elections) were won by Democrats. 
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At any rate, there have been a fair number of close general elections in 
Harris County throughout the early part of this century.152 
Campaign finance has also been an integral part of the judicial 
landscape in Texas for decades. In 1980, Texas was the first state to 
have a judicial race costing over $1 million; the 12 candidates in the 
1988 supreme court elections raised $12 million in total.153 The 7 
winning candidates for the Texas supreme court from 1992–1997 each 
raised an average of $1.3 million, with more than 40% of those funds 
“contributed by parties or lawyers with cases before the court or by 
contributors linked to those parties.”154 As shown below, Harris 
County district judges also actively raise money for their campaigns, 
often from attorneys who practice before them.155 
2. Indigent Defense Case Assignments.  Like most of Texas and 
many other states,156 Harris County relies primarily on assigned 
counsel to provide indigent defense, where judges are supposed to 
distribute cases to attorneys via a wheel that rotates through a list of 
eligible lawyers.157 Such systems are prevalent throughout Texas, as 
 
 152. Using the same data, see id., we found that the margin of victory was less than 2 
percentage points in 13.33% of elections (12 out of 90) and less than 5 percentage points in 30% 
of elections (27 out of 90). 
 153. Judicial Selection, supra note 148.  
 154. Id. 
 155. See infra Part III.C.1.  
 156. TEX. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, PRIMER, supra note 98, at 3; Spangenberg & Beeman, 
supra note 86, at 33. 
 157. FABELO ET AL., IMPROVING INDIGENT DEFENSE, supra note 98, at 12. Currently, to be 
added to the master list of eligible attorneys, licensed Texas attorneys who are in good standing 
must have at least two years of criminal law practice experience, pass a certification test (or be 
board certified in criminal law), and satisfy certain continuing legal education requirements. 
Minimum Requirements, Appointed Attorney Candidates, HARRIS CNTY. DIST. CTS., https://
www.justex.net/JustexDocuments/0/FDAMS/2017/quickGuide.pdf [https://perma.cc/J32P-BN5D]. 
To be assigned third-degree felony cases, the attorney must have “[t]ried to verdict at least three 
(3) felony jury trials as lead counsel.” Id. To be assigned second-degree felony cases, she must 
have “[p]racticed criminal law for at least four (4) years and tried to verdict at least four (4) felony 
jury trials as lead counsel.” Id. And to be assigned first-degree felony cases, the attorney must 
have “[p]racticed criminal law for at least five (5) years, tried to verdict at least eight (8) felony 
jury trials as lead counsel and been accepted as competent to receive first-degree appointments 
by a majority of the district judges.” Id. The attorney must also “[e]xhibit proficiency and 
commitment to providing quality representation to criminal defendants [and] [d]emonstrate 
professionalism and reliability when providing representation to criminal defendants.” Id. Finally, 
the attorney must be voted onto the master list by a majority of district court judges. Id. According 
to a local defense attorney, these testing requirements did not always exist, and were only added 
after counsel assignments in Harris County came under increased scrutiny. Murray Newman, Too 
Much for Too Few, LIFE AT THE HARRIS CNTY. CRIM. JUST. CTR. BLOG (Jan. 26, 2013, 1:03 
PM), http://harriscountycriminaljustice.blogspot.com/2013/01/too-much-for-too-few.html [https:// 
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only nine counties in the state currently have public defender’s 
offices.158 Harris County is one of those counties, though in reality, it 
only assigns a small percentage of cases to its public defender. 
Although the county created a public defender’s office in 2010, the 
Harris County public defender handles less than three percent of the 
cases in our sample.159 Moreover, these public defenders are simply 
treated as additional attorneys to be added to the wheel.160 Hence for 
all practical purposes, Harris County relies almost exclusively on 
assigned private attorneys for indigent defense.161 
3. Attorney Donations and Case Assignments.  News articles and 
interviews reveal how deeply Harris County has struggled with 
indigent defense case assignments over the past many decades. Former 
State Senator Rodney Ellis, now county commissioner for Precinct 
One in Harris County, notes a common refrain: “Judges who will 
remain nameless still try and tell me that the judge picking the lawyer 
is better [than a statewide public defender system] . . . because they 




 158. MAPPING AM. PUB. DEF. PROJECT, https://safe-stream-85568.herokuapp.com [https://
perma.cc/B2AP-SXBB].  
 159. See infra Table 1 (noting that 7,853 cases were assigned to public defenders out of 290,633 
total cases in our sample, which is approximately 2.7%); see also infra, note 181 and accompanying 
text. This number has been increasing over time; our data show that the Harris County public 
defender handled just over 5% of the felony cases in 2017.  
 160. See, e.g., FABELO ET AL., IMPROVING INDIGENT DEFENSE, supra note 98, at 31 (noting 
that one division of the Harris County public defender’s office appears on the wheel for random 
assignments).  
 161. See id. at 19–20 (explaining the size and scope of public defender representation in Harris 
County is small, “as it is currently designed to absorb only 5–6% of the overall docket, particularly 
in felonies and misdemeanor trial-level cases”); see also Texas: Quick Guide, GIDEON AT 50, http:/
/gideonat50.org/in-your-state/texas/#state-independence [https://perma.cc/7JNS-6YCB] (“The 
vast majority of Texas indigent defense representation, even in those jurisdictions that have a 
public defender office, is provided by appointed attorneys.”).  
 162. Neena Satija, How Judicial Conflicts of Interest Are Denying Poor Texans Their Right to 
an Effective Lawyer, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 19, 2019, 12:00 AM) [hereinafter Satija, Judicial Conflicts 
of Interest], https://www.texastribune.org/2019/08/19/unchecked-power-texas-judges-indigent-
defense [https://perma.cc/Y9SN-7C4Y]. A recent time-use study showed that Texas indigent 
defense attorneys spend remarkably little time on cases they are assigned. See DOTTIE 
CARMICHAEL, AUSTIN CLEMENS, HEATHER CASPERS, MINER P. MARCHBANKS III & STEVE 
WOOD, GUIDELINES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE CASELOADS: A REPORT TO THE TEXAS 
INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSION xv (2015), http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/31818/
150122_weightedcl_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZCP5-WCSW] (conducting a time-use study of 
Texas indigent defense attorneys and finding the following average disposal times for these classes 
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Attorneys practicing in Harris County echo Ellis’s concern about 
the efficacy and ethics underlying indigent appointments there. 
Houston criminal defense attorney Robert Fickman describes one of 
the ways that attorneys seeking appointments curry favor with the 
judges who assign them cases: 
There’s a certain number of court-appointed lawyers who appear to 
be appointed primarily for their ability to move the docket . . . . The 
trade-off is that the judge is appointing Lawyer X to lots of cases, and 
in return for the appointments, Lawyer X is moving those cases, which 
meets the judge’s objective.163 
Sometimes the quid pro quo is even more explicit. Drew Willey, a 
criminal defense attorney practicing in Houston and nearby Galveston 
County, describes witnessing pay to play firsthand while working as a 
new lawyer under a retired judge who took many felony appointments 
in Harris County: 
A few months into working on his cases, [the attorney] told us that 
he’d be charging us a monthly fee out of our hourly pay to donate to 
[the] judge’s campaign funds. He said these donations were necessary 
to keep his lights on and keep allowing him to pay us. Me and one 
colleague were abhorred enough to speak up. We approached this 
attorney separately, strongly voicing our opposition to this 
systematized pay for play conflict. He told me and that one colleague 
that we were exempt from being charged his donation fee, but 
continued to make the donations, openly admitting it was so that he 
could continue to get more appointments in those courts . . . . [After 
I left his office,] I know the pay for play continued, because that 
attorney later, in passing, told me that the elections of new judges 
meant that he “lost” some courts and had to begin donating more to 
different judges in order to keep getting appointments.164 
Willey also reports that the prevalence of pay to play adversely 
affects the quality of representation that indigent defendants receive: 
 
of cases: Class B misdemeanor (4.7 hours); Class A misdemeanor (7.6 hours); state jail felonies 
(10.8 hours); third-degree felonies (12.9 hours); second-degree felonies (15.2 hours) and first-
degree felonies (22.3 hours)). The report suggested that an attorney’s annual caseload should not 
exceed: “236 Class B Misdemeanors[,] 216 Class A Misdemeanors[,] 174 State Jail Felonies[,] 144 
Third Degree Felonies[,] 105 Second Degree Felonies[, or] 77 First Degree Felonies.” Id. at 34. 
 163. Jo DePrang, Poor Judgment, TEX. OBSERVER (Oct. 12, 2015, 8:56 AM), https://
www.texasobserver.org/poor-judgment [https://perma.cc/753Z-LA4V]; see also Bright, supra 
note 24, at 859 (“Some judges appear more concerned about cost containment and administrative 
efficiency than insuring a zealous defense.”). 
 164. Interview with Drew Willey, Crim. Def. Att’y (Sept. 26, 2019) (on file with Authors).  
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[T]he disparities [in caseloads among attorneys make it] obvious that 
pay to play is continuing in some very specific courts. This level of 
corruption leads to human lives being forgotten in jail without anyone 
to stand up for them. We’ve handled cases in which these overloaded 
attorneys have not even visited their clients for 6–10 months at a 
time—pretrial.165 
Notably, these types of behavior are not limited to Harris County’s 
adult felony courts. A 2008 Houston Chronicle analysis of the juvenile 
appointment system found that “[a] relatively small group of attorneys, 
some of them old friends and all financial backers of judges handing 
out work, regularly receives close to half of all the tax-funded 
appointments to represent the poor in the juvenile courts . . . .”166 These 
concerns continue today, as a recent report indicates that “a handful of 
private attorneys—some of whom happened to be generous 
contributors to judges’ campaign coffers—got more than 300 [case 
assignments]” while “juvenile public defenders received fewer and 
fewer appointments over several years, so that in 2017 they each had 
an average load of 140 juvenile cases, which is below the office’s 
imposed limit of 200 . . . .”167 
B. Construction of the Data 
In this Section, we explain how we combined numerous datasets 
to show more precisely how campaign contributions might affect 
indigent defense case assignments in Harris County. Specifically, we 
combine six types of data from Harris County: (1) criminal cases and 
their outcomes; (2) judicial elections; (3) campaign contributions to 
judicial candidates; (4) annual revenue earned by attorneys for 
indigent defense appointments; (5) attorney eligibility for indigent 
defense appointments; and (6) attorney bar information. Figure 1 
summarizes the relevant information in these datasets and how we link 
them together. 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Sarah Viren, Lawyers Picked for Juveniles Give Campaigns Cash, HOUS. CHRON. (Apr. 
20, 2008, 5:30 AM), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Lawyers-picked-for-
juveniles-give-campaigns-cash-1759443.php [https://perma.cc/2Z8Y-ND92]; see also Neena 
Satija, Harris County Juvenile Judges and Private Attorneys Accused of Cronyism: “Everybody 
Wins but the Kids,” TEX. TRIB. (Nov. 1, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/
11/01/harris-county-texas-juvenile-judges-private-attorneys [https://perma.cc/3VY8-JAK6] 
(“[Harris] [C]ounty’s three juvenile district courts . . . have been assigning an extraordinary 
number of cases to a handful of private lawyers.”). 
 167. Satija, Judicial Conflicts of Interest, supra note 162.  
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FIGURE 1: HARRIS COUNTY DATASETS 
 
Our central dataset tabulates criminal cases and outcomes 
provided to us electronically upon request by the Harris County district 
clerk (“HCC”) in 2018 and 2019. We focus on felony cases in the 
dataset, which comprise the universe of all such cases disposed in 
Harris County district court from January 2005 through May 2018. The 
dataset includes information on all indigent defense counsel 
appointments made by district judges during that time period, as well 
as the characteristics of the cases to which they were assigned. The 
HCC dataset includes the full name and an identifier for the appointed 
attorney;168 the type of appointment (either public defender, appointed 
attorney, or hired attorney); the defendant’s full name, sex, age, race, 
and address; and case characteristics like the offense level and degree, 
sentence type and sentence duration, and filing and disposition dates. 
We combine these data with a dataset on Harris County judicial 
elections, compiled by parsing PDFs of election results provided by the 
 
 168. The identifier is a System Person Number (“SPN”), used to identify the individual 
throughout the dataset. We converted the SPN number into the corresponding attorney bar 
number, allowing us to merge it with attorney-related data in other datasets. 
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Harris County clerk on its website.169 Although the HCC case data do 
not include the name of the presiding district judge, we can identify this 
information by looking at electoral outcomes for district court races 
and identifying each judge’s electoral history. Thus, by merging these 
data, we can precisely identify which judge appointed which counsel in 
an indigent defense case.170 
Next, we connect the data to campaign contributions data, 
provided electronically by the Texas Ethics Commission (“TEC”) on 
its website.171 This dataset encompasses all political contributions to 
district court candidates in Texas from 2004 to 2016.172 The TEC 
dataset includes information on contribution dates and amounts, along 
with self-reported identifying information from contributors such as 
occupation, employer, and zip code.173 This information supplements 
the case data with identifiers for attorneys who have contributed to the 
appointing judge, which might happen before, during, or after the 
judge’s tenure.174 
 
 169. See Election Results, supra note 150. 
 170. We also know which judicial candidates received donations from eligible attorneys but 
failed to be elected. In related work, we are conducting a regression discontinuity design to 
measure the effect of donations on appointments. For a guide to regression discontinuity designs, 
see generally David S. Lee & Thomas Lemieux, Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics, 
48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 281 (2010). In particular, we can causally estimate the impact of 
donations by comparing case appointments for attorneys who donated to judicial candidates who 
barely won an election versus case assignments for attorneys who donated to candidates who 
barely lost. 
 171. See Search Campaign Finance Reports, TEX. ETHICS COMM’N, https://www.ethics.state.tx.us/ 
search/cf [https://perma.cc/AEN5-5E2R]. 
 172. Contributions data prior to 2004 are not particularly accurate and are hence excluded 
from our data. Consequently, we might underestimate the number of contributions received by 
judges who held office prior to 2005. 
 173. Some attorney contributors list themselves using the name of their private practice; for 
example, John Doe might donate as “Law Offices of John Doe.” If a law firm has just one named 
partner, we assign that contribution to the named partner. When a law firm has more than one 
named partner, or it is unclear who the main partner is, we do not assign such contribution to any 
attorney. To illustrate, contributions under the name of “The Law Firm of John Doe” would be 
attributed to John Doe, while contributions from “Do, Re, Mi and Associates” would not be 
attributed to anyone. Since we cannot capture these donations, we likely underestimate the 
number of donations from attorneys to judges in our sample. In addition, in 81 instances, matched 
attorneys contributed jointly with their spouses or someone else. In all of these cases, only one of 
the names in the pair matched to someone in the list of appointed attorneys. We dropped the 
unmatched contributor name off our list of contributors and attribute the whole donation amount 
to the appointed attorney. 
 174. Matching the contributors in the TEC dataset to the attorneys in the HCC dataset is not 
easy. This is in part because the TEC lacks any unique identifier for political contributors, and 
does not provide other identifying data like mailing address and employer. We take advantage of 
the name variation in the HCC dataset to identify different ways that attorneys might list their 
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The fourth dataset we connect are payments made by the state of 
Texas to appointed attorneys. This information is tracked and provided 
online by the Texas Indigent Defense Commission (“TIDC”)175 and is 
comprehensive and accurate for 2014–2018.176 The TIDC data include 
information on how much each attorney earned in total from each 
court (that is, each judge) during each fiscal year 2014–2018.  
The TIDC data do not provide granular detail as to specific 
attorney payments, as in payments made based on the number of days 
an attorney appeared in court or worked on a case outside of court. 
The data do, however, include attorney bar numbers, which allow us to 
accurately merge the revenue data with our cases database. Therefore, 
the HCC case data can be connected with both attorney contributions 
data and attorney revenue data. This allows us to estimate a return on 
investment for donors. That is, if pay to play exists, we can estimate the 
revenue that donor attorneys received for each dollar they contributed. 
The fifth dataset connects our data to information on attorneys 
who are appointed to cases in the district court, as compiled by the 
State Bar of Texas on its website.177 This dataset includes demographic 
information on attorneys, including when the attorney obtained their 
legal license in Texas and what law school they attended.178 We also 
obtain this information for all judges in our dataset, allowing us to test 
 
names for contribution purposes. We use these names to look for political contributions made by 
attorneys who have been appointed at least once in any district court in Harris County. For 
attorneys unmatched by their exact listed name, we do a second round of matching using fuzzy 
matches between unmatched attorney names and contributor names. We accomplish this by using 
the Stata function matchit to compare each name with the neighborhood of the subsequent five 
unmatched names in alphabetical order. After that, we look at the matches suggested and keep 
the suggestion only if the similarity is above a certain threshold (.85). Finally, we manually audit 
the data to confirm the matches we have made are not false positives and to search for matches 
we may have missed. 
 175. See Statewide Attorney Caseload Report, TEX. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, http://
tidc.tamu.edu/public.net/Reports/AttorneyCaseLoad.aspx [https://perma.cc/5CF9-WWK6]. 
 176. Note that we could obtain reliably accurate revenue only for fiscal years 2014–2018, but 
our donation data stretch from 2004–2018. Hence, the actual return on investment might be 
significantly higher than what we estimate here. Our estimate is likely only a floor on the real 
return rate. 
 177. We thank Professor Kyle Rozema for providing us with the Texas bar data. See generally 
Kyle Rozema, Lawyer Misconduct in America (Jan. 2, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://
www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/lawandeconomics/workshops/Documents/Paper%202.
%20Kyle%20Rozema.Lawyer%20Misconduct%20in%20America.pdf [https://perma.cc/PLZ9-
WHXD] (scraping bar data from Texas and eighteen other states to create a novel dataset on 
lawyer misconduct).  
 178. We also merge this dataset with 2020 data from U.S. News and World Report, which 
provides an annually updated, widely followed list of law school rankings. This allows us to 
compare the law schools attended by donor and non-donor attorneys. 
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whether certain social networks might be driving results, such as an 
attorney or judge being approximately the same age or attending the 
same law school. 
Finally, we combine all these data with information on when 
attorneys applied for approval as indigent defense counsel, obtained 
electronically in 2019 after an information request to the Harris County 
district court. Per the detailed discussion below, we can see whether 
attorney donations were correlated with their addition to the list of 
eligible indigent defense counsel, known as “the wheel.” For example, 
if pay to play exists, we might expect to see an attorney donating to a 
judge when she applies for or is approved to be added to the wheel.” 
C. Summary Statistics 
1. Cases and Contributions.  Together, these datasets shed light on 
the relationships between Harris County district court judges and 
indigent defense counsel. Table 1 provides some summary statistics on 
our final data.179 We cover the universe of 290,633 felony cases180 in 
which indigent defense counsel were assigned and ascertainable in 
Harris County between January 2005 and May 2018, spread over all 22 
district courts. There were 45 different judges who assigned counsel in 
these cases. The vast majority of the cases—97.30%—were assigned to 
private attorneys; the remainder were assigned to a public defender.181 
Attorneys who practiced before these judges also donated money 
to those judges. In particular, we see that from 2004–2018,182 Harris 
County district court judges received a total of $622,917 over 1,841 
 
 179. Our final dataset does not include information on ninety cases for which we were unable 
to match the attorney to a lawyer listed in state bar attorney rolls. It also does not include 35 cases 
in which the listed defense attorney was identical to the judge in the case. These discrepancies are 
likely due to minor clerical errors in the cases dataset. 
 180. Harris County assigns a unique case number to each charged offense, even if they are 
actually part of the same case. This might occur, for example, if a prosecutor charges a defendant 
for one crime, then dismisses those charges completely and charges for a different crime later. To 
account for such scenarios, we treated different case numbers as part of the same case if the two 
case numbers involved the same attorney, court, and defendant identifier, as well as sharing either 
the same filing date or the same disposition date. Our results remain robust to different 
aggregation methods, or if we instead conducted the same analysis at the charge-level rather than 
the case-level. Moreover, the vast majority of cases (87.47%) in our sample involved just one 
charged offense. 
 181. Because public defenders are also assigned to the wheel system, and are treated as 
attorneys to be appointed in cases, we include them in our analysis below. However, our results 
are substantially the same if we exclude them instead. 
 182. While our case data begin in 2005, we include donations data from 2004 onward since 
judges who began their terms in 2005 ran for election in 2004. 
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donations from attorneys who practiced at some point before those 
judges. These donations were relatively modest in size—the average 
donation was $338.36, with donations rarely exceeding $1,500.183 
TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS ON CASES AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
Felony Cases with Appointments: 2005–2018 
Total number of cases and attorneys: 290,633 cases, 772 attorneys 
Appointed private attorneys 282,780 cases, 747 attorneys 
Appointed public defenders 7,853 cases, 66 attorneys 
Number of courts 22 
Number of judges 45 
Number of general elections 8 
 
Campaign Contributions: 2004–2018 
Total number of donations: all 
appointed attorneys to all judges 
1,841 
Total donation amount: all 
appointed attorneys to all judges 
$622,917 
 
Contribution Amounts for Appointed Attorneys 









Next, we examine case and attorney characteristics, both in the 
aggregate as well as split out by donor and non-donor attorneys. Table 
2 summarizes these data below. Of the 772 attorneys who were 
assigned at least one indigent defense case between 2004–2018, 25.65% 
(198 attorneys) donated to at least one Harris County district court 
 
 183. The smallest donation in the sample was $25; the largest was $5,000.  
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judge (or candidate who was elected judge) during our sample time 
frame. 
TABLE 2: DONORS VS. NON-DONORS—CASE CHARACTERISTICS FOR 
APPOINTED ATTORNEYS (2005–2018) 
 All Donor Non-Donor 
Number of Attorneys a 772 198 (25.65%) 574 (74.35%) 
  
Felony Type b  
1st Degree Felony 6.28% 6.88% 6.13% 
2nd Degree Felony 16.07% 16.67% 15.92% 
3rd Degree Felony 22.28% 22.01% 22.35% 
State Jail Felony 53.41% 52.35% 53.67% 
Capital Felony 0.17% 0.27% 0.14% 
  
Defendant b  
% White 45.81% 43.72% 46.33% 
% Female 20.30% 20.38% 20.28% 
Mean Age (years) 33.42 33.35 33.44 
    
Attorney Characteristics b  
Average rank of law 
school attended 
116.35 107.43 118.60 
Years since admission 22.95 25.36 21.09 
a “Donor” = 1 if attorney donated at least once to some judge during sample period 
b “Donor” = 1 if attorney donated at least once to the assigning judge during sample period 
Donors and non-donors were assigned similar types of cases, 
though donors on average handled slightly more serious felonies.184 For 
example, first-degree felonies make up a slightly higher share of donor 
cases (6.88%) as compared to non-donor cases (6.13%). And state jail 
felonies—which are the least severe class of felony in Texas—make up 
 
 184. Even though the magnitude of most differences between donor and non-donor groups 
in Table 2 is small, they are statistically significant at the 5% level, with the exception of defendant 
age and gender. This is due to the large sample size we have here, which lets us detect even small 
differences across groups. 
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52.35% and 53.67% of all cases for donors and non-donors, 
respectively.185 
The demographic characteristics of defendants assigned to donors 
and non-donors are also quite similar. Donors were slightly less likely 
to represent White defendants relative to non-donors (43.72% versus 
46.33%). Both groups were very similar in terms of their clients’ gender 
and age—just under 80% were male, with an average age of about 33 
for both groups.  
Finally, donor and non-donor attorneys are relatively similar in 
terms of their educational and experiential background. The average 
law school ranking of an assigned attorney in our sample is 116.35, 
though donor attorneys attended slightly better-ranked law schools 
(average of 107.43) relative to non-donors (average of 118.60). Donor 
attorneys also have more experience, as measured by years between 
the attorney’s admission to the Texas bar and the filing date of a case 
(25.36 versus 21.09 years). 
2. Donations, Appointments, and Revenues.  As described above, 
there are only slight measurable differences in the types of cases and 
types of defendants assigned to donor and non-donor indigent defense 
counsel. Donor and non-donor defense counsel also appear largely 
similar in terms of their educational and experiential background. 
By contrast, there are stark differences between donor and non-
donor attorneys in terms of the number of cases assigned to them by 
donee judges, as well as the fees they earned from such cases. This is 
clear from Table 3 below, which shows summary statistics on appointed 
cases and received revenues across all attorneys, as well as split out 
between donors and non-donors. 
 
 185. Offense level was missing in 4,092 cases (1.41% of the total sample). Those cases have 
been excluded from the data when tabulating the percentages in Table 2. 
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TABLE 3: DONORS VS. NON-DONORS—CASES APPOINTED AND REVENUES 
(2005–2018) 
 All Donor Non-Donor 










Cases Appointed: Donate to 
Appointing Judge b 




Average Case Pendency (days) b 105.77  108.77 105.02 
  
Attorney–Judge Pairs b  





Average Revenue by Pair $16,300 $31,081 $13,992 
Average Number of Cases 
Assigned Per Pair 
27.10 52.93 24.13 
a “Donor” = 1 if attorney donated at least once to some judge during sample period 
b “Donor” = 1 if attorney donated at least once to assigning judge during sample period 
As noted previously, over one-quarter of assigned attorneys 
contributed to at least one judge within our sample period. But these 
donor attorneys were assigned over half (52.37%) of the cases in our 
sample. Moreover, 20.16% of all cases in which a judge assigned 
indigent defense counsel involved an attorney who donated at some 
point to that specific judge. 
The disparity in case assignment between donor and non-donor 
attorneys becomes clearer when we look at attorney–judge pairings—
that is, unique pairings between judges and attorneys who were 
assigned at least one indigent defense case in our sample period. Out 
of 10,723 attorney–judge pairings in our sample, 1,107 (10.32%) 
involved an attorney who at some point donated to that judge. 
On average, an attorney in an attorney–judge pairing was assigned 
27.10 indigent defense cases from that judge and earned $16,300 in 
indigent defense fees for those cases, yielding an average of $601.48 per 
case. This shows us how indigent defense cases can be surprisingly 
SUKHATME IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/16/2020  1:35 AM 
2021] PAY TO PLAY? 817 
lucrative if, as often occurs, an attorney spends just one or two days in 
total on each case she is assigned. To illustrate, an attorney who 
handles one such case each day and works 200 days a year would earn 
$120,296.186 
We can also see that an average non-donor attorney was assigned 
slightly fewer cases—24.13 cases, with earnings of $13,992, or an 
average of $579.86 per case. By contrast, the average donor was 
assigned more than twice the number of cases by that judge and earned 
more than twice the revenue on those cases relative to the average non-
donor—52.93 cases and $31,081 in revenues. Donors earn 
approximately the same as non-donors per case ($587.21), which 
suggests their additional revenue comes from the additional cases they 
are assigned, not from additional revenue per case assigned. 
We can more easily show these differences between donors and 
non-donors graphically, as depicted in the histograms in Figure 2 
below. Like before, these graphs look at unique attorney–judge pairs. 
The top panel of Figure 2 shows the natural log of cases187 assigned to 
attorneys who donated to the appointing judge. The gray bars show the 
distribution of cases assigned to non–donor attorneys while the white 
bars show the distribution of cases assigned to donors. The white 
distribution is shifted to the right relative to the gray distribution. This 
means that donor attorneys were assigned more cases than non-donor 
attorneys.188 
 
 186. Contrast this with public defenders, which were estimated to earn median entry-level 
salaries of $58,000, and “increasing to about $96,000 . . . for those with 11–15 years of experience.” 
Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for L. Placement, New Public Service Attorney Salary Figures from 
NALP Show Slow Growth Since 2004 1 (July 9, 2018), https://www.nalp.org/uploads/PSASR_7-
9-18_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ME7-UZNM]; see also Public Defender Salary in Texas, 
ZIPRECRUITER (last updated Sept. 6, 2020), https://www.ziprecruiter.com/Salaries/How-Much-
Does-a-Public-Defender-Make-a-Year—in-Texas [https://perma.cc/SW8R-N6MD]. 
 187. It is common to take the natural log of variables that are positive and highly skewed—in 
other words, when there are a few entries that are very large relative to others. Often this includes 
revenue or income, or count variables such as number of cases. For display purposes, logging 
variables also compresses the histogram into a more reasonable range. At any rate, the results are 
very similar in graphs in which the standard count rather than the natural log is used. 
 188. Note that when we compare how many cases a judge assigned to donor attorneys versus 
non-donor attorneys, we are comparing among the class of attorneys who appeared at least once 
before that judge. Hence, our results are not just a product of the judge simply being unaware of 
the non-donor attorneys. The judge did in fact appoint each of the non-donor attorneys at least 
once during our sample period, and hence, presumably knew who they were and could have 
appointed them more times. 
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FIGURE 2: APPOINTMENTS AND REVENUES FOR DONOR VS.  
NON-DONOR ATTORNEYS 
This relationship is even more apparent when revenue is 
examined. The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows log revenue for donor 
attorneys (in white) versus log revenue for non-donors (in gray). Once 
again, the distribution for donor attorneys is clearly shifted to the 
right—that is, attorneys who donated to a judge received more revenue 
than attorneys who did not donate to any judge. 
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D. Pay to Play: Regressions and Graphical Evidence 
1. Donations, Appointments, and Revenues.  The summary data 
show clear differences in assignment patterns to donors and non-
donors. In particular, donee judges assign twice the number of cases to 
their donors relative to non-donors. Still, such results might be 
explained by differences, observable or unobservable, across attorneys 
or judges. 
To illustrate how this might happen, suppose that donors are just 
better attorneys. Then maybe it makes sense for judges to award them 
more cases—not because they are donors but because they are simply 
higher quality lawyers. Indeed, perhaps attorneys who can afford to 
give donations are implicitly demonstrating, through their wealth, their 
legal prowess. If this were true, we might expect the donor group to 
comprise more successful attorneys who “deserve” more 
appointments. 
We can show this is an unlikely explanation in a few different 
ways. To begin, we can use ordinary least squares (“OLS”) regression 
analysis,189 which allows us to control for attorney- or judge-specific 
factors.190 Tables 4 and 5 present these results below, which show 
observations for all attorney–judge pairs in which a judge assigned at 
least one case to an attorney during our sample period.  
 
 189. We obtain similar results if we use logistic regressions instead for specifications with 
binary outcome variables. For an explanation of OLS regression analysis, see Valentina Alto, 
Understanding the OLS Method for Simple Linear Regression, MEDIUM (Aug. 17, 2019), https://
towardsdatascience.com/understanding-the-ols-method-for-simple-linear-regression-
e0a4e8f692cc [https://perma.cc/UWE2-29H5].  
 190. We cannot rule out that time-varying, unobservable differences across donor and non-
donor cases are driving the differences in case assignment or revenues that we see here. But we 
doubt this is the case, given the size of these differences and how closely they hew to donation 
practices, as discussed in more detail below. 
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TABLE 4: CASES ASSIGNED / REVENUE EARNED FOR DONORS TO ASSIGNING 
JUDGE VS. NON-DONORS 
In Table 4, the key regressor of interest in all columns is “Donor,” 
a dummy variable (such as a 0/1 variable) that = 1 when the attorney 
was a contributor to the judge and = 0 when the attorney was never a 
contributor. The outcome variable in columns (1)–(3) is the total 
number of indigent defense cases assigned by a particular judge to a 
particular attorney. In columns (4)–(6), the outcome variable is total 
fees earned by an attorney across all indigent defense cases assigned by 
a particular judge.191 
Column (1) presents the most parsimonious specification, with no 
controls. The coefficient for “Donor” is 28.79, and it is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This means that donors on average were 
assigned over 28 more cases by their donee judges relative to non-
donors. Column (4) translates this into dollars, as it presents the same 
specification but with total revenues as the outcome variable. Here, we 
can see donors to an assigning judge earn on average about $17,089 
more than non-donor attorneys. 
The remaining columns introduce a variety of controls for 
attorney or judge characteristics. Columns (2) and (5) capture 
observable differences across attorneys and judges, as they include 
separate controls for the number of years practicing since admission to 
 
 191. Note that we have fewer judge–attorney pairs in these columns because we only have 
revenue data from TIDC for 2014–2018. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. If anything, 
that suggests our estimates of revenues earned are underestimated, since we only have an estimate 
of the fees earned by attorneys during those years and cannot measure fees earned prior to 2014. 
Thus, indigent defense work is likely significantly more profitable than we show here. 
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the Texas bar for the attorney and the judge;192 controls for law schools 
attended by the attorney and the judge;193 a dummy variable for 
whether the attorney ever served as a public defender; and a dummy 
variable for whether the attorney and the judge attended the same law 
school.194 
Columns (3) and (6) capture unobservable, time-invariant 
differences across attorneys and judges. They accomplish this by 
including fixed effects for attorneys (controls that should capture time-
invariant attorney-specific behavior) and fixed effects for judges 
(controls that should capture time-invariant judge-specific behavior). 
Notably, controlling for these differences does not change the 
results in any substantial way. Whether we add controls for observable 
differences in attorneys and judges, as in columns (2) and (5), or if we 
add in judge- and attorney-fixed effects, as in columns (3) and (6), the 
coefficient remains roughly similar in magnitude and maintains its 
statistical significance. 
We now turn to Table 5, identical to Table 4 except that now the 
regressor of interest is “Total Donated,” which is the total dollar 
amount that an attorney has ever donated to a judge over time. Column 
(1) again presents the most parsimonious specification, with no 
controls. The coefficient in column (1) is 0.064, which is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This means that every dollar donated by an 
attorney to a judge is associated with 0.064 additional cases assigned to 
that attorney. If we interpret this within a pay-to-play context, then $1/
0.064 = $15.63 is the price for an attorney to “buy” a single case from a 
judge. 
 
 192. In addition to proxying for a judge’s legal experience, this variable indirectly captures 
whether the judge is of a similar age as an attorney. This might matter, for example, if we think 
that judges and attorneys who are similar in age are more likely to be friends, and that this 
friendship, rather than campaign donations, is driving the results here.  
 193. These are “fixed effects” for law school—separate dummy variables added for each 
separate law school attended by an attorney in our sample. We obtain similar results if we instead 
include law school ranking as a control. 
 194. Controlling for the law school tries to capture the effects of attending a specific law 
school itself, whereas the “same law school” dummy variable might capture a “camaraderie” or 
social “network effect.” For example, if judges are biased toward attorneys who attended their 
alma mater, then this dummy variable would capture that effect. The controls for experience 
might also capture similar social network effects, to the extent that judges and attorneys with 
similar levels of experience in the legal system are more likely to be connected socially. 
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TABLE 5: CASES ASSIGNED / REVENUE EARNED FOR EACH DOLLAR 
DONATED TO ASSIGNING JUDGE 
Similarly, column (4) presents the same specification but with total 
revenues as the outcome variable. Here, we can see that each dollar 
contributed from an attorney to a judge on average results in $27.95 in 
fees from that judge. Within a pay-to-play context, this can be 
interpreted as a return on investment—a $1 donation by an attorney 
yields $27.95 in revenues. 
Like Table 4, the addition of attorney- or judge-level controls in 
columns (2) and (5) or fixed effects in columns (3) and (6) does not 
substantially impact the results. They remain at approximately the 
same magnitude and are highly statistically significant. Once again, this 
suggests that systematic differences between donor and non-donor 
attorneys, such as differences in their experience or education, are not 
driving the results here. 
2. Comparisons Within the Donor Class.  Still, one might wonder 
whether these results can be explained by some difference between 
donors and non-donors that cannot be easily captured by regression 
controls. One way we can assess whether such a claim might be driving 
our results is to focus only on the sample of donors and see whether 
our results remain. Specifically, we can exploit the fact that a donor 
typically only contributes to some, but not all, of the judges she appears 
before. Therefore, if we limit our sample only to attorneys who 
donated to at least one judge, a natural comparison is to see whether 
donors received more case assignments from their donee judges 
relative to judges to whom they did not donate. If so, that would 
suggest there is something specific in the judge–donor relationship, 
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rather than something special about the donor herself, that is causing 
the judge to assign more cases to that attorney. 
Once again, graphs can dramatically illustrate the results. Figure 3 
below limits our sample only to attorneys who donated to at least one 
judge during our sample period of 2004–2018. Like Figure 2, the 
histogram on the top shows the natural log of cases, and the histogram 
on the bottom shows the natural log of revenues. The white bars again 
represent attorney–judge pairs in which the attorney donated to that 
judge. The gray bars now show attorney–judge pairs in which the 
attorney did not donate to that judge, but where she did donate to some 
other judge. 
Once again, the white distribution is shifted to the right for both 
the cases and revenues graphs. In other words, attorneys in the donor 
class received significantly more cases—and earned significantly more 
revenue—from their donee judges relative to other judges to whom 
they did not donate. This implies there is nothing special about donor 
attorneys themselves earning them additional case assignments. 
Rather, there is something specific to the donor–judge relationship that 
is driving that result, since only judges to whom attorneys donated 
seem to assign those attorneys a disproportionate number of cases.195 
 
 195. We can also run the same regression analysis as we did earlier, but this time limited to 
attorneys who donated to at least one judge. Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2 present this analysis, 
with Table A.1 presenting the same specifications as Table 4, and Table A.2 presenting the same 
specifications as Table 5. We can see that all of the regression coefficients remain highly 
significant and are similar in magnitude as in the previous tables. This once again shows that 
attorney- or judge-level differences do not seem to be driving our results. 
 In addition, we can compare attorneys who donated more than one time to a judge 
(“multiple donors”) with attorneys who never donated or donated just once to the judge. If pay 
to play is occurring, one might expect that multiple donors would be assigned more cases and earn 
more revenues as compared to non-donors and single-time donors. This is, in fact, what we find. 
In Appendix Table A.3, we see that multiple donors are on average assigned between 35.86 and 
40.03 more cases, and earn between $17,361 and $23,979 more revenue, than non-donors and 
single-time donors to a judge. Appendix Table A.4 presents similar results when we limit our 
sample just to attorneys who donated to at least one judge in our sample.  
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FIGURE 3: DONOR APPOINTMENTS AND REVENUES FROM  
DONEE JUDGES VS. OTHER JUDGES 
 
3. Donation Timing and “Entry Fees.”  So far, we have shown that, 
first, donor attorneys are assigned more cases (and earn more revenue) 
than non-donors and, second, that attorneys who donate receive more 
cases (and earn more revenue) from their donee judges relative to 
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other judges to whom they did not donate. Given our controls, these 
donation patterns cannot be explained by observable differences 
across attorneys or judges, such as where they attended law school, the 
ranking of the law school, or the years of practice experience they 
might have. They also cannot be easily explained by social network 
arguments, such as an alumni connection to a particular school that 
both judges and attorneys attended, or similarities in age or years of 
experience. Moreover, they cannot be explained by unobservable 
differences across attorneys and judges that remain fixed over time. All 
of these results are consistent with a system in which pay to play is 
rampant, as anecdotal evidence suggests. 
Still, our analysis can go further. Another approach to get more 
evidence of pay to play is to exploit the timing of donations relative to 
appointments. A prerequisite for appointment as indigent defense 
counsel is getting added to a list of eligible attorneys, as noted above. 
If pay to play is occurring, one might expect donors to give their 
donations either just before or soon after they become eligible to 
receive cases. One could view this type of donation as an “entry fee” 
that attorneys must pay judges to receive appointments. 
Because we know when counsel became eligible to be assigned 
cases, and when they gave their first donation to a judge, we can test 
whether in fact this is true. Figure 4 below graphically displays our 
results as a histogram. It tracks the difference in years between when 
an attorney first donated to a judge and when she first became eligible 
to be appointed as indigent defense counsel.196 A negative value means 
that the attorney donated prior to becoming eligible to receive cases; a 
positive value means that she donated after gaining eligibility. A “0” 
value means the attorney donated in precisely the same year she 
became eligible to receive cases. If an attorney donated in an election 
year, then a value of 0, 1, 2, or 3 means that the attorney received her 
first appointment from that judge in the four-year term following that 
donation. 
 
 196. In Figure 4, we limit our sample of attorney–judge pairs to judges who were elected in 
2008 or later and attorneys who became eligible for appointment in 2008 or later. This prevents 
data censoring issues that might skew the graph, since we do not have donation data prior to 2004, 
and we do not know the exact year when attorneys who were listed as eligible in 2005 first gained 
their eligibility. The same general trends typically hold, however, even if we limit our sample in 
other ways. 
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FIGURE 4: FIRST DONATION RELATIVE TO CASE ASSIGNMENT ELIGIBILITY 
If donations and appointments were completely unrelated, one 
might expect a uniform distribution—that is, a relatively flat graph 
from left to right. But that is clearly not true here. This graph peaks at 
0, and the majority of the distribution is just to the right. This means 
most attorneys who donated to a judge first donated soon after they 
became eligible to receive appointments from that judge. In fact, in 
over half of all attorney–judge pairs in which the attorney donated to 
the judge (54.7%), the first donation to the judge occurred between 
zero and three years following the year the attorney became eligible to 
receive indigent defense counsel cases.197 
If we also include donations that occurred in the year prior to 
eligibility—a plausible time to donate if one wants to pay to play, since 
an attorney must be voted in by a majority of judges before she is 
placed on the eligible list198—then the percentage of relevant attorney–
judge pairs jumps to 62.6%. These facts are again consistent with a pay-
to-play system, where newly eligible or soon-to-be-eligible attorneys 
pay entry fees they believe will persuade judges to assign them cases. 
4. Case Outcomes.  The differences in revenue and case 
assignment might be less troubling if donors consistently achieve better 
 
 197. This distribution is inconsistent with an alternate story, in which lawyers get to know 
judges by practicing before them and then donate to the judges they think are good. 
 198. See supra note 157. 
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outcomes for their clients relative to non-donors. Indeed, this story is 
not completely implausible—if pay to play is occurring, then perhaps 
the attorneys who pay are buying better results for their clients.199 
The data, however, provide no evidence to suggest this is true. 
Table 6 below shows summary statistics that compare whether donors 
and non-donors achieve various positive outcomes for their clients. We 
define an outcome as “good” (Good outcome = 1) if a charge200 is 
dismissed or reduced,201 or the defendant is acquitted; and an outcome 
as “not good” (Good outcome = 0) if the defendant is convicted or 
pleads guilty or no contest.202 By this metric, non-donor attorneys do 
slightly better than donors (37.45% versus 37.01%). Defendants 
represented by non-donors are also less likely to end up in the Texas 
Department of Corrections (16.53% for non-donors versus 17.97% for 
donors) and receive shorter prison or jail sentences on average (663.24 
and 767.74 days for non-donors and donors, respectively). 
 
 199. See infra notes 214–15 and accompanying text (noting an accusation from Oklahoma 
district attorney that a judge was partial toward defense attorneys who donated to her campaign). 
 200. We conduct our analysis here at the charge level, since whether a defendant is convicted 
or acquitted and what the sentence he receives is determined at that level. Nonetheless, our results 
remain similar if we aggregate up to the case level instead. 
 201. We can determine whether charges are reduced by comparing the offense level in the 
complaint (for example, first-degree felony or second-degree felony) and the offense level when 
the case was disposed. 
 202. Some outcomes are ambiguous whether they are good or bad; we exclude those charges 
when defining this variable. For example, it is ambiguous whether an outcome is good when the 
case is dismissed because the defendant died or when the defendant was convicted on another 
charge. 
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TABLE 6: DONORS VS. NON-DONORS—CASE OUTCOMES (2005–2018) 
 All Donor Non-
Donor 





Cases Appointed: Any Donation a — 152,200 (52.37%)  
138,433 
(47.63%) 
Cases Appointed: Donate Appt. 
Judge b 




Average Case Pendency (days) b 105.77  108.77 105.02 
  
Outcomes b, c  
Good Outcome d 37.36% 37.01% 37.45% 
Texas Dept. of Corrections 16.82% 17.97% 16.53% 
Harris County Jail 28.02% 25.52% 28.66% 
State Jail 19.64% 19.69% 19.63% 
Mean Prison/Jail Time (days) 684.11 767.74 663.24 
a “Donor” = 1 if attorney donated at least once to some judge during sample period 
b “Donor” = 1 if attorney donated at least once to assigning judge during sample period 
c   All outcomes defined at the individual charge level 
d “Good” = 1 if charges dismissed or reduced, or defendant acquitted or found not 
guilty; = 0 if defendant found or pled guilty or no contest 
A reasonable concern is that these slight differences in outcomes 
might be driven by differences in case or defendant characteristics. 
Based on what we can observe, however, this does not seem to be true 
either. We can control for various case and defendant characteristics 
through an OLS regression analysis, as presented in Table 7 below. 
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TABLE 7: CASE OUTCOMES FOR DONOR VS. NON-DONOR ATTORNEYS 
The outcome variable in columns (1)–(2) is a dummy variable for 
whether the attorney achieves a “good” outcome as defined earlier. In 
columns (3)–(4), the outcome is a dummy variable for whether the 
defendant receives a term of imprisonment in the Texas Department 
of Corrections, which is typically where most substantial prison 
sentences are served. And in columns (5)–(6), the outcome variable is 
the sentence of jail or imprisonment received for a charge. Odd-
numbered columns include controls for whether a defense attorney is 
a public defender and for the type of crime charged,203 while even-
numbered columns also include dummy variables for whether a 
 
 203. Because outcomes depend so heavily on the type of crime that is charged, we include as 
a control the type of offense charged even in our base specifications. We can distinguish between 
631 different charged crimes, often split quite finely. For example, within the narrow category of 
“trademark counterfeiting,” we can distinguish between five different classes based on the 
amount of the offense. 
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defendant was White or female, a control for the defendant’s age, and 
fixed effects for the judge in the case. 
We can see that generally speaking, donor attorneys perform 
worse than non-donor attorneys. If anything, donor attorneys appear 
between 0.05 and 0.44 percentage points less likely to obtain a good 
outcome, though the results are not always statistically significant.204 
Donors are between 0.57 and 0.75 percentage points more likely to 
have a client who is sentenced to a term in the Texas Department of 
Corrections. And defendants represented by donor attorneys receive 
jail or prison sentences that are between 18.32 and 33.71 days longer 
than defendants represented by non-donor attorneys. 
Of course, these results should be taken with a grain of salt. It is 
possible that unobservable differences across cases are driving the 
slightly worse outcomes we see for donor attorneys. Nonetheless, 
based on this evidence, it would be hard to conclude that the opposite 
holds true—that donor attorneys are in fact doing significantly better 
on the whole than their non-donor counterparts. If anything, donors 
appear to be underachieving for their clients relative to non-donors. 
This is what we should probably expect, given the significant additional 
caseload that donors choose to take on.205 
IV.  A NATIONWIDE PHENOMENON? THE POTENTIAL SCOPE OF 
JUDICIAL PAY TO PLAY 
As we have seen in Harris County, assigned counsel and some 
contract attorneys have financial incentives to amass large numbers of 
indigent defense cases to maximize their revenues. A bigger question 
is whether this sort of thing could happen elsewhere, or in other 
contexts. Put differently, might judicial pay to play be a nationwide 
problem? 
Although a definitive answer to this question requires more 
empirical analysis, qualitative evidence suggests the problem might be 
pervasive. To begin, there have been similar reports of pay to play in 
other counties across Texas. For example, in Bexar County—Texas’s 
 
 204. Since about 37% of all defendants receive a good outcome, this translates into between 
about 0.14% to 1.19% difference between donors and non-donors. 
 205. One possible counterargument is that since the outcome differential is relatively small 
between donors and non-donors, perhaps donors would actually outperform non-donors if they 
were not assigned so many more cases. Even if this is true, however, and donor attorneys are 
better in this sense, the current system in which donors receive a disproportionate number of 
cases is likely suboptimal. 
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fourth most populous county with nearly two million people206—a 
recent editorial decried the phenomenon of attorneys contributing to 
judges handing out appointments, calling it “a dynamic that raises 
inherent questions of fairness in the justice system and undermines 
public trust.”207 
Campaign finance is similarly linked to a dysfunctional indigent 
defense system in Travis County, home to Austin, the state’s capital.208 
When a Travis County judge was asked how a lawyer she appointed to 
over four hundred cases in a year could possibly give his clients a full 
defense, the judge replied, “Lawyers have a personal responsibility. 
They know what they can handle. Do we really need to tell a lawyer, 
‘Don’t do that’?”209 
 
 206. See TEX. DEMOGRAPHIC CTR. AT THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT SAN ANTONIO, ESTIMATES OF 
THE TOTAL POPULATIONS OF COUNTIES AND PLACES IN TEXAS FOR JULY 1, 2018 AND 
JANUARY 1, 2019, at 6 tbl.1 (2019), https://demographics.texas.gov/Resources/TPEPP/Estimates/
2018/2018_txpopest_county.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP2Y-C9W9]. 
 207. Attorney Contributions to Judges Taints the System, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS 
ED. BD. (Nov. 10, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/editorials/article/
Attorney-contributions-to-judges-taints-the-system-13379208.php [https://perma.cc/9UCF-
9FSA]. 
 208. See Satija, Judicial Conflicts of Interest, supra note 162.  
 209. Id.; see also Andrew Weber, Travis County’s Public Defender Office Is Officially Funded, 
AUSTIN MONITOR (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.austinmonitor.com/stories/2019/08/travis-
countys-public-defender-office-is-officially-funded [https://perma.cc/F5AD-6ND9] (discussing 
the efforts to fund a public defender office in Travis County). In May 2019, Travis County applied 
for a grant to create a public defender office. Satija, Judicial Conflicts of Interest, supra note 162. 
That grant was approved on August 29, 2019. Weber, supra.  
 More generally, Texas’s indigent defense system has been subject to large-scale critiques 
for decades. In 2000, the nonprofit Texas Appleseed undertook a statewide survey on indigent 
defense practices. Its final report, released in December 2000, contained 28 findings about Texas’s 
indigent defense system for non-capital felonies and misdemeanors at the time. The findings 
included: a “complete absence of uniformity in standards and quality of representation among 
the indigent defense systems” in the Texas counties surveyed by Appleseed; that “uncontrolled 
discretion given to judges over attorney selection and compensation . . . creates the potential for 
conflicts of interest”; and that costs per capita for indigent defense were approximately $4.65, 
making Texas near the bottom of all 50 states for indigent defense funding. TEX. APPLESEED 
FAIR DEF. PROJECT, THE FAIR DEFENSE REPORT 43–51 (2000) [hereinafter TEX. APPLESEED 
REPORT], https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/184-FairDefenseAct-Appleseed
AnalysisReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z48Z-WHYM]. 
Following the issuance of Appleseed’s report on indigent defense in December 2000, the 
Texas Legislature passed the Fair Defense Act in 2001, which required state judges in all Texas 
counties to adopt written procedures for delivery of indigent defense services in a timely and fair 
manner. Fair Defense Act, sec. 6, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1800, 1803 (codified as amended at TEX. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.04 (West 2019)). This legislation created a state body to 
administer policies and funding across the state, the Texas Task Force on Indigent Defense, 
renamed the Texas Indigent Defense Commission in 2011. FABELO ET AL., IMPROVING 
INDIGENT DEFENSE, supra note 98, at 10.  
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Moreover, it is unlikely that judicial pay to play is simply a Texas 
phenomenon. Other states have become increasingly aware that 
campaign finance might affect their trial courts’ decisionmaking.210 In 
Oklahoma, just across the Red River from Texas, a controversy has 
emerged over attorneys donating to the civil trial court judges they 
practice before, with one review showing that more than half of the 
donations to district judge candidates in 2018 came from thousands of 
individual attorneys.211 Claiming the system puts judicial candidates in 
a “weird position,” Oklahoma defense attorney and 2018 district 
judicial candidate Misty Fields went so far as to send a letter to 
attorneys in the area “asking for their vote, but not ‘for public support 
of any kind.’”212 Her letter notwithstanding, Fields ultimately ended up 
accepting donations from attorneys, claiming it was a necessary part of 
the campaign: 
I would be remiss to say money doesn’t matter . . . . You can only do 
so much with free social media and you can only knock on so many 
[doors]. It’s a sad part of it, but you need some money if you want to 
blanket an area with signs or newspaper ads.213 
A recent controversy between a prosecutor and a district court 
judge has exposed how Oklahoma’s criminal trial judges might be at 
risk as well. In September 2019, prosecutor David Prater publicly 
requested that District Judge Kendra Coleman recuse herself for 
failing to disclose her campaign donors, claiming that Coleman 
repeatedly showed favoritism toward donor attorneys and their clients 
 
 210. Prior scholarly analysis of the impact of campaign finance on judicial decisionmaking has 
focused almost exclusively on the state supreme court level. See supra note 28 and accompanying 
text. Sue Bell Cobb, former chief justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, lamented the role 
campaign finance played in her election to the bench, admitting “those of us seeking judicial office 
sometimes find ourselves doing things that feel awfully unsavory.” Sue Bell Cobb, I Was 
Alabama’s Top Judge. I’m Ashamed by What I Had To Do to Get There, POLITICO MAG. (Mar.–
Apr. 2015), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/03/judicial-elections-fundraising-
115503 [https://perma.cc/WJ5T-QMJP]. “Donors want clarity, certainty even, that the judicial 
candidates they support view the world as they do and will rule accordingly . . . . They want to 
know that the investments they make by donating money to a candidate will yield favorable 
results.” Id. 
 211. Trevor Brown, Attorneys Help Bankroll Campaigns of Judges Who Hear Their Cases, 
OKLA. WATCH (Oct. 8, 2018), https://oklahomawatch.org/2018/10/08/attorneys-help-bankroll-
campaigns-of-judges-who-hear-their-cases [https://perma.cc/5EZG-PJPP]. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. Fields ultimately lost her district court election to Shawn S. Taylor, who received 
54.2% of the vote compared to Fields’ 45.8%. OKLA. STATE ELECTION BD., OFFICIAL RESULTS- 
GENERAL ELECTION 373–74 (2018), https://www.ok.gov/elections/support/20181106_cnty.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2S99-TXLS]. 
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in her court.214 Highlighting the need for public trust in the courts, 
Prater condemned Coleman’s lack of transparency: “For each day this 
Court sits in judgment of parties appearing before it, no one—neither 
the parties, their counsel, nor the public—can be assured that the 
decisions being rendered have not been influenced by campaign 
contributions or other circumstances that this Court is actively 
endeavoring to conceal.”215 
Despite such stories, many Oklahoman attorneys and judges 
remain unconvinced that the system needs to change. For example, 
George Gibbs, an attorney who donated to a judge before whom he 
had an open civil case, notes, “Our state judges are more impartial, 
have better temperaments and are more fair than federal judges . . . . 
No judge is going to risk their career, their standing and their 
reputation over a donation.”216 
Michigan also appears susceptible to links between campaign 
finance and trial court decisionmaking. A 2016 report on Michigan’s 
indigent defense system found that court-appointed attorneys do very 
little work on their cases, with records indicating that in nearly a 
quarter of criminal cases in a three-county area, an indigent criminal 
defendant met their attorney for the first time at their initial court 
appearance.217 The same report also found that court-appointed 
attorneys donated thousands of dollars to the campaigns of circuit 
court judges.218 David Carroll, executive director of the Sixth 
Amendment Center, describes how Michigan’s system impacts 
indigent criminal defendants: “[Indigent defendants] may get a lawyer 
in name only, because that person has so many cases or has financial 
conflicts of interest. It’s as if you’re going into court with no lawyer at 
all.”219 
 
 214. Nolan Clay, DA Says Judge Concealed Donors, Should Step Down from All Her Cases, 
OKLAHOMAN (Sept. 5, 2019, 1:04 AM), https://oklahoman.com/article/5640461/da-says-judge-
concealed-donors-should-step-down-from-all-his-cases? [https://perma.cc/4T4N-W6RD]. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Brown, supra note 211. 
 217. Justin A. Hinkley & Matt Mencarini, Court-Appointed Attorneys Paid Little, Do Little, 
Records Show, LANSING STATE J. (Nov. 4, 2016, 9:02 AM), https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/
story/news/local/watchdog/2016/11/03/court-appointed-attorneys-paid-little-do-little-records-
show/91846874 [https://perma.cc/3MJM-332A]. 
 218. Id.  
 219. Max Johnston, Trials and Tribulations of Court-Appointed Attorneys in Michigan, 
INTERLOCHEN PUB. RADIO (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.interlochenpublicradio.org/post/trials-
and-tribulations-court-appointed-attorneys-michigan [https://perma.cc/8GG2-GXEZ]. Former 
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These states are not the only ones struggling to manage the impact 
of campaign finance on their trial court systems. In 2004, the ABA 
Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants created a 
comprehensive report on the state of the right to counsel to 
commemorate Gideon’s fortieth anniversary.220 Relying on the public 
testimony of attorneys from around the country, the Committee found, 
“In many localities, the selection and payment of counsel is still under 
the control of judges or other elected officials instead of an 
independent authority as recommended by national standards.”221 It 
continued: 
Accordingly, lawyers must depend on judges to approve their 
compensation claims, as well as requests for expert or investigative 
services. Attorneys may be removed from court-appointed lists if they 
apply for fees considered by judges to be too high, creating a 
disincentive to spend adequate time on a case. In some places, elected 
judges award court appointments as favors to attorneys who support 
their campaigns for re-election.222 
There is no reason to believe the situation has improved since 
then. In late 2014, the ABA identified thirty-nine states with judicial 
elections, either partisan, nonpartisan, or retention.223 Thirty of those 
states ban judges from personally soliciting funds for campaigns, 
 
public defender Eve Primus, who studies Michigan’s indigent defense issues, also emphasizes how 
poor defendants bear the brunt of Michigan’s dysfunctional system: 
It isn’t the rich white people who are being dragged through this system . . . . If you 
cared about “Brown v. Board of Education” and if you cared about the way we treated 
minorities in this society and you thought separate but equal was a bad thing, you 
should care about the criminal justice system because that’s where separate and not 
equal seems to be the pervasive concept. 
Hinkley & Mencarini, supra note 217. 
 220. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 130, at 1. 
 221. Id. at 39. 
 222. Id. (emphasis added) 
 223. Brief for The American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 
App. 1A–20A, Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433 (2015) (No. 13-1499) [hereinafter ABA 
Brief] (writing in support of a suit against the Florida Bar, whose ban on personal solicitation by 
judicial candidates was challenged as violating the First Amendment). 
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though many of them allow campaign committees to solicit on their 
behalf,224 and most allow judges to accept unsolicited funds.225 
Moreover, many other states with elected trial judges permit 
judicial candidates to solicit campaign funds or have bans with 
significant loopholes that allow candidates to indirectly receive—and 
know they have received—donations from attorneys who appear 
before them. These states include Alabama,226 California,227 Georgia,228 
 
 224. Id. at 5. For example, Alaska judges stand for retention election and are prohibited from 
personal solicitation, though candidates may create campaign contribution committees, which 
“are not prohibited from soliciting and accepting reasonable campaign contributions and public 
support from lawyers.” See id. at App. 2A–3A (citing ALASKA CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT 5(C)(3)). 
Some states indicate that judges should not be informed who contributed to the campaign 
committee. See, e.g., COLO. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT 4.3(A)(5); IDAHO CODE OF JUD. ETHICS 
4.4(C); MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT 4.4(B)(3); N.M. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT 21-402(E); cf. 
LA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT 7(A)(6), cmt. 2 (“A judge or judicial candidate is prohibited from 
personally soliciting or personally accepting campaign contributions, but is not prohibited from 
knowing the identities of his or her campaign contributors.”). 
 225. See DEBORAH GOLDBERG & SAMANTHA SANCHEZ, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS 2002: HOW THE THREAT TO FAIR AND IMPARTIAL COURTS SPREAD TO MORE 
STATES IN 2002, at 23 n.27 (2004), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/
Report_NewPoliticsReport2002.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2FB-Y93A] (noting that in virtually every 
state, judicial candidates are not allowed to solicit contributions directly and must rely on 
campaign committees or unsolicited donations).  
 226. Alabama judges are elected and “strongly discouraged from personally soliciting 
campaign contributions.” ALA. CANONS OF JUD. ETHICS 7(B)(4)(a). The Canons highly 
recommend that “a candidate establish committees of responsible persons to solicit and accept 
campaign contributions, to manage the expenditure of funds for the candidate’s campaign, and to 
obtain public statements of support for his or her candidacy,” and note that “[s]uch committees 
may solicit and accept campaign contributions and public support from lawyers.” Id.  
 227. Cal. Canon 5(b)(4) provides: 
In judicial elections, judges may solicit campaign contributions or endorsements for 
their own campaigns or for other judges and attorneys who are candidates for judicial 
office. Judges are permitted to solicit such contributions and endorsements from anyone, 
including attorneys and other judges, except that a judge shall not solicit campaign 
contributions or endorsements from California state court commissioners, referees, 
court-appointed arbitrators, hearing officers, and retired judges serving in the 
Temporary Assigned Judges Program, or from California state court personnel. In 
soliciting campaign contributions or endorsements, a judge shall not use the prestige of 
judicial office in a manner that would reasonably be perceived as coercive. 
CAL. CODE OF JUD. ETHICS 5(B)(4) (emphasis added). 
 228. “Georgia judges are elected in non-partisan elections [and] may personally solicit 
campaign contributions and publicly stated support.” ABA Brief, supra note 223, at app. 6A. But 
see Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding Georgia’s canon is not 
narrowly tailored to serve Georgia’s compelling interest in judicial impartiality, as the canon 
prohibits judicial candidates from soliciting campaign contributions while allowing the 
candidate’s election committee to do so). 
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Kansas,229 Kentucky,230 Maryland,231 Missouri,232 Montana,233 
Nevada,234 North Carolina,235 and Ohio.236 Each of these states also 
relies, at least to some extent, on assigned counsel systems.237 Hence, 
 
 229. A judicial district may choose to have elected trial judges, and judges may solicit 
campaign contributions. See ABA Brief, supra note 223, at app. 8A (noting Kansas’s prohibition 
on personally soliciting campaign contributions was struck down in Yost v. Stout, No. 06-4122-
JAR, 2008 WL 8906379 (D. Kan. Nov. 16, 2008)).  
 230. See ABA Brief, supra note 223, at app. 8A (citing, with approval, Carey v. Wolnitzek, 
614 F.3d 189 (6th Cir. 2010), which found Kentucky’s solicitation clause unconstitutional). 
 231. See ABA Brief, supra note 223, at app. 9A (“Trial court judges are elected in non-
partisan elections. The Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit candidates from 
personally soliciting or accepting contributions.”). 
 232. Missouri Rule 2-4.2(B) states “candidate[s] shall not solicit in person campaign funds 
from persons likely to appear before the judge. [They] may make a written campaign solicitation 
for campaign funds of any person or group, including any person or group likely to appear before 
the judge.” MO. SUP. CT. R. 2-4.2(B); see also ABA Brief, supra note 223, at app. 11A. 
 233. Montana judges are elected in non-partisan elections and can personally solicit campaign 
contributions. See ABA Brief, supra note 223, at app. 12A. 
 234. NEV. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT 4.2(B)(4) (permits judges who are opposed in elections, 
which are non-partisan, to personally solicit and accept campaign contributions); see also ABA 
Brief, supra note 223, at app. 12A. 
 235. Judges are elected in publicly funded, non-partisan elections in North Carolina. Canon 
7(B)(4) states a judge or judicial candidate in North Carolina may “personally solicit campaign 
funds and request public support from anyone for his/her own campaign or, alternatively, and in 
addition thereto, authorize or establish committees of responsible persons to secure and manage 
the solicitation and expenditure of campaign funds.” N.C. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT 7(B)(4); see 
also ABA Brief, supra note 223, at app. 14A. 
 236. The Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits candidates and judges from personally 
soliciting campaign contributions in Rule 4.4(A). OHIO CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT 4.4(A). But a 
judicial candidate may make “a general request for campaign contributions when speaking to an 
audience of twenty or more individuals;” “sign letters soliciting campaign contributions if the 
letters are for distribution by the judicial candidate’s campaign committee and the letters direct 
contributions to be sent to the campaign committee and not to the judicial candidate;” or “make 
a general request for campaign contributions via an electronic communication that is in text 
format if contributions are directed to be sent to the campaign committee and not to the judicial 
candidate.” Id. (emphasis omitted); see also ABA Brief, supra note 223, at app.15A. The Ohio 
Supreme Court recently amended Superintendence Rule 8, which states in part: 
For appointments frequently made in the court or division, a procedure for selecting 
appointees from a list maintained by the court or division of persons pre-qualified to 
serve in the capacity designated by the court or division . . . . To ensure an equitable 
distribution of appointments, the court or division may utilize a rotary system from a 
graduated list that pairs the seriousness and complexity of the case with the 
qualifications and experience of the person to be appointed. 
OHIO SUP. CT. R. § 8(B)(2)(a). 
 237. For instance, consider California. See, e.g., California: Quick Guide, GIDEON AT 50, http:/
/gideonat50.org/in-your-state/california/#state-independence [https://perma.cc/9AUY-4NVC] 
(explaining California provides very little funding and oversight over right to counsel services at 
both the trial and appellate level, stating that most “rural counties provide services through flat-
fee contracts with private firms or with individual attorneys for primary and for conflict services. 
SUKHATME IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/16/2020  1:35 AM 
2021] PAY TO PLAY? 837 
when considering this list of states in addition to Texas, Oklahoma, and 
Michigan,238 it is apparent that campaign finance might increase the gap 
between attorney and defendant interests in judicial systems across 
multiple states, collectively home to tens of millions of Americans. 
V.  THE PERVASIVENESS OF THE INCENTIVE GAP: CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE REGULATION AND OTHER REFORMS 
The likely prevalence of pay to play, as revealed by our 
quantitative and qualitative analysis, is troubling. In part, this is 
because a system in which attorneys buy cases from judges runs counter 
to common notions of legal ethics and justice. And in part, it is because 
donor attorneys might underperform for their clients relative to non-
donors, as our analysis suggests. 
But perhaps most discomforting is that pay to play lays bare the 
core dysfunction in the right to counsel: many attorneys assigned to 
represent indigent defendants do not share their clients’ interests. 
More concisely, pay to play is just a symptom of the incentive gap.  
The centrality and pervasiveness of the incentive gap suggests that 
minor changes to campaign finance laws or case assignment rules will 
not eliminate pay to play. And even more importantly, such minimal 
reforms are unlikely to significantly improve the quality of 
representation for indigent defendants. This is because reforms that 
solely target pay to play do not necessarily reduce assigned counsel’s 
core incentives to seek out as many cases as possible or to only work 
minimally on each case they are assigned. So long as this incentive gap 
remains, attorneys and judges are likely to find ways around such 
reforms. 
These problems become apparent when we look more closely at 
some plausible reforms that target pay to play. For example, consider 
a reform prohibiting donee judges from appointing their donors as 
 
There is no oversight board for any trial-level system in any California county. With a few notable 
exceptions, most right to counsel systems are overseen by the county’s legislative board”). 
 238. Interestingly, both Oklahoma and Michigan have judicial ethics codes prohibiting judges 
from personally soliciting campaign contributions. Compare OKLA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT 
4.1(A)(8) (stating that a candidate shall not “personally solicit or accept campaign contributions 
other than through a campaign committee”), and MICH. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT 7(B)(2)(a) (“A 
candidate should not personally solicit or accept campaign funds.”), with TEX. CODE OF JUD. 
CONDUCT 4(D)(1) (permitting judges to solicit “funds for appropriate campaign or officeholder 
expenses as permitted by state law”). That media reports from each state suggest that judges, in 
fact, do receive campaign contributions from attorneys who practice in their court calls into 
question the efficacy of such bans in preventing pay to play. See supra notes 210–19. 
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counsel239 for at least some time period following a contribution—
perhaps until an intervening election cycle has passed, even 
permanently. Such a rule might reduce the incidence of pay to play, as 
judicial donations would now cost attorneys potential revenue in future 
indigent defense cases.240 But it would not address situations in which 
attorney appointments precede donations—something we observe in 
our data and which might become more prevalent if such a reform is 
enacted. Thus, attorneys and judges might still conduct pay to play by 
tacitly agreeing to transact in cases first and in donations later. 
More substantial reforms could further reduce judges’ discretion 
to assign indigent defense cases. Mandatory rotation policies, in which 
judges are supposed to assign attorneys from a rotating wheel, are 
examples of such an approach. Putting aside whether such a system is 
optimal or best serves defendants’ interests—as there is no reason to 
believe that an even split of cases across all eligible attorneys is 
necessarily ideal—our empirical results suggest such systems are 
honored more in the breach. Harris County criminal court judges are 
supposed to follow a wheel assignment system, but as we have seen, 
they often distribute cases highly unevenly among attorneys eligible for 
appointments in their courts. 
One might go further and remove the case assignment power from 
judges altogether. Some jurisdictions already have such managed 
assigned counsel systems, which place the assignment power with an 
independent commission or entity.241 But these systems face numerous 
political242 and practical obstacles that can limit their effectiveness in 
 
 239. Alternatively, this same rule could be configured from the perspective of the assigned 
attorney: ethics rules could prohibit him from seeking or accepting a case assignment from a judge 
to whom he has donated. 
 240. Relatedly, it would have the positive secondary effect of disincentivizing attorneys from 
donating to a judge before whom they might want to practice in the future. 
 241. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.  
 242. Texas provides a case in point. In 1999, the Texas Legislature passed a bill to create a 
statewide managed assigned counsel system, but the bill was subsequently vetoed by then-
Governor George W. Bush. Satija, Judicial Conflicts of Interest, supra note 162. He stated in his 
veto proclamation:  
Senate Bill No. 247 proposes a drastic change in the way indigent criminal defendants 
are assigned counsel. While well-intentioned, the effect of the bill is likely to be neither 
better representation for indigents nor a more efficient administration of justice. The 
bill inappropriately takes appointment authority away from judges, who are better able 
to assess the quality of legal representation, and gives it to county officials. The bill 
creates the potential for counties to set up a new layer of bureaucracy that could result 
in increased backlogs and decreased court efficiency. 
Official Memorandum from the State of Tex., Off. of the Governor George W. Bush, Veto of S. 
B. 247 (June 20, 1999), https://lrl.texas.gov/scanned/vetoes/76/sb247.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AKY-
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practice. For example, Travis County created an independent agency 
to oversee indigent defense in 2015. But even with this reform, cases 
are still assigned in a grossly uneven manner.243 
Moreover, even if trial judges are divested of the power to assign 
indigent defense cases, they could find other ways to reward their 
donors. For example, if a judge’s approval is required to fulfill attorney 
requests for out-of-court case preparation expenses and expert 
opinions—as is often the case—then a judge would still have the 
opportunity to be more generous with her donors than with non-
donors in granting such requests. 
Instead of focusing on attorney appointments, policymakers might 
instead target pay to play through campaign finance reform. For 
example, policymakers could prohibit judges from personally soliciting 
donations from practicing attorneys. Such an approach would likely 
pass constitutional muster following the Supreme Court’s recent 5–4 
decision in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,244 in which the Court applied 
strict scrutiny245 and upheld a Florida ethics rule banning judicial 
candidates from personally soliciting any campaign funds.246 The Court 
found that the state had a compelling governmental interest “in 
preserving public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary”247 and 
that the solicitation ban was narrowly tailored toward that interest.248 
A restriction that merely prohibited judicial candidates from soliciting 
funds from practicing attorneys would be narrower in scope than the 
Florida ban249 and would thus be presumptively constitutional. 
 
6WES]. Bush’s statement points out some of the political challenges of taking appointment power 
away from state judges. See id.  
 243. See Neena Satija, Travis County Overhauled Legal Representation for the Poor, But 
Lawyers Are Still Overwhelmed, TEX. TRIB. (Apr. 26, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://
www.texastribune.org/2018/04/26/travis-county-overhauled-legal-representation-poor-lawyers-
are-still-o [https://perma.cc/XJW9-KFKS] (noting that one attorney was assigned 349 felony and 
434 misdemeanor cases in 2017). 
 244. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433 (2015). 
 245. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer argued that a less exacting standard 
should apply for judicial elections. See id. at 457. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Republican 
Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 803 (2002)). The dissent agreed with the majority that strict 
scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review. See id. at 1685 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 246. Id. at 1662 (majority opinion).  
 247. Id. at 1666–68. 
 248. In so finding, the Court relied in part on the fact that the Florida law allowed candidates 
to set up campaign committees to solicit donations. See id. at 1660.  
 249. Texas does not appear to have any such ban:  
A judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely 
on the judge’s impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of the judicial duties, 
exploit his or her judicial position, or involve the judge in frequent transactions with 
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Yet such a ban would not necessarily eliminate pay to play. Unless 
the ban also applied to judicial campaign committees, attorneys could 
funnel money indirectly into judges’ coffers. And a judge would still 
know which attorneys supported his candidacy by seeing who donated 
to the committee—thus the judge could still reward those attorneys 
with case assignments.250 This loophole might lead one to wonder to 
what extent a Florida-style ban is more about form rather than 
substance.251 
Of course, the solicitation ban could be extended beyond what was 
considered in Williams-Yulee to instead prohibit judges from soliciting 
practicing attorneys either personally or via their campaign 
committees. But given that the Roberts Court has otherwise 
consistently invalidated restrictions on campaign finance252 and any 
such regulation would be reviewed under strict scrutiny,253 it is unclear 
whether these additional limitations would be constitutional. 
Moreover, a ban on solicitations from a campaign committee 
would not touch unsolicited contributions from attorneys. The identity 
of judicial candidates is common knowledge; as such, an attorney could 
simply send an unsolicited check directly to a candidate as a campaign 
 
lawyers or persons likely to come before the court on which the judge serves. This 
limitation does not prohibit either a judge or candidate from soliciting funds for 
appropriate campaign or officeholder expenses as permitted by state law. 
TEX. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT 4(D)(1) (emphasis added). 
 250. Some states allow campaign committees to solicit donations but prohibit the committees 
from divulging the names of donors to candidates. See, e.g., ABA Brief, supra note 223, at app. 
7A (reporting such an arrangement in Idaho). Of course, a donor attorney could still presumably 
announce to the judge that she in fact did make such a donation, thereby side-stepping such a 
rule.  
 251. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Supreme Court Upholds Ban on Judicial Candidates Soliciting 
Campaign Contributions — Even Via Mass Mailings, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2015, 2:55 PM), https:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/04/29/supreme-court-upholds-ban-on-
judicial-candidates-soliciting-campaign-contributions-even-via-mass-mailings [https://perma.cc/
XY4Z-PVAY] (concluding a ban might limit the context of face-to-face personal solicitations, 
which might be different if conducted by a judicial candidate vis-à-vis a representative of her 
campaign committee). 
 252. See Richard L. Hasen, Election Law’s Path in the Roberts Court’s First Decade: A Sharp 
Right Turn but with Speed Bumps and Surprising Twists, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1597, 1604 (2016) 
(discussing the Roberts Court’s moves to deregulate campaign finance); John O. McGinnis, 
Neutral Principles and Some Campaign Finance Problems, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 841, 851–95 
(2016); see also Noah B. Lindell, Comment, Williams-Yulee and the Anomaly of Campaign 
Finance Law, 126 YALE L.J. 1577, 1581–87 (2017). 
 253. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
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donation. Such a donation would comply with state campaign laws so 
long as it did not exceed rules regulating contribution limits.254 
These examples all illustrate the practical difficulties of 
eliminating pay to play in assigned counsel systems. The fundamental 
problem is that judges and attorneys want to transact with one another, 
even after reforms are enacted. Put differently, attorneys still gain from 
trade with judges, who can provide them income, and judges still gain 
from trade with attorneys, who can provide them financial and political 
support. Thus, these parties have strong incentives to circumvent 
restrictions on contributions or case assignments. 
More importantly, even if pay to play is eliminated, this will not 
necessarily improve the quality of representation for poor defendants. 
Many indigent defense attorneys maintain outside dockets with paying 
clients. Given what this research reveals about the financial 
motivations of many assigned counsel, it is unrealistic to believe these 
attorneys would devote as much time and effort to their indigent clients 
as they would to their paying ones, unless doing so offered reputational 
or financial gains. Indeed, a recent empirical analysis suggests that 
court-appointed attorneys in San Antonio, Texas, generally obtain 
worse outcomes for their indigent clients relative to their paying 
clients, even after controlling for differences in case characteristics.255 
Hence, the incentive gap will continue to plague indigent defendants 
so long as assigned counsel have incentives to shirk on the effort they 
expend on such cases.  
CONCLUSION 
“There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets 
depends on the amount of money he has.”256 Despite this 
pronouncement by the Supreme Court made in the decade prior to 
 
 254. Another more radical approach would be to eliminate popular election of judges 
altogether. As of 2015, 39 out of 50 states had some form of judicial election (either partisan, non-
partisan or retention elections). See ABA Brief, supra note 223, at app. 1A–20A. Eliminating 
popularly elected judges would eliminate the need for campaign funds and the possibility of pay 
to play. Still, such an approach would still not eliminate the incentive gap. 
 255. See generally Amanda Agan, Matthew Freedman & Emily Owens, Is Your Lawyer a 
Lemon? Incentives and Selection in the Public Provision of Criminal Defense 2 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24579, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24579 
[https://perma.cc/2E2V-EP7F] (finding that case characteristics and within-attorney differences 
across cases drive these results); see also id. at 3 (“[A]ttorneys resolve their assigned cases 13% 
faster than their retained cases, consistent with reduced effort.”). 
 256. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (plurality opinion). 
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Gideon, indigent defendants still face a system in which their interests 
are regularly brushed aside by those who are supposed to represent 
them. This phenomenon is caused at least in part by poor design: 
indigent defense systems often create financial incentives for counsel 
that are at odds with their client’s best interests. 
This Article is the first to demonstrate with criminal court data 
that this incentive gap is empirically linked to trial court campaign 
contributions. We find that attorneys regularly donate to trial court 
judges before whom they appear. These contributions often look like 
entry fees from attorneys who have recently become eligible for 
indigent defense appointments. Judges, in turn, appoint donor 
attorneys to over twice as many indigent defense cases as non-donor 
attorneys, with donors often earning tens or even hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in revenues. Importantly, our results are not 
driven by unobservable differences between donors and non-donors: 
only judges to whom attorneys donated assign those attorneys a 
disproportionate number of cases. 
In addition, the donor attorneys in our sample are, if anything, less 
successful than non-donor attorneys in achieving charge reductions, 
dismissals, or acquittals, and in avoiding prison sentences for their 
clients. This is not caused solely by observable differences in defendant 
or case characteristics or by unobservable time-invariant differences. 
We suggest donor attorneys might do worse for their clients simply 
because they have so many more cases assigned to them. 
Moreover, the phenomenon we identify here is likely widespread. 
Though our data are limited to Harris County—the nation’s third most 
populous county—our qualitative evidence suggests pay to play exists 
throughout Texas. Pay to play might also affect millions of Americans 
in other states such as California, Georgia, Maryland, Missouri, North 
Carolina, and Ohio, among others, that permit attorneys to contribute 
to the judges who control indigent defense appointments. 
The apparent prevalence of pay to play in our criminal courts 
should be a wake-up call about the state of indigent defense in America 
and the corrosive influence of money in the judiciary. Our assigned 
counsel system has failed to align the interests of defense attorneys 
with those of their clients. Until we eliminate this incentive gap,257 
Gideon’s promise will remain out of reach. 
 
 257. A complete analysis of how the incentive gap might be eliminated is unfortunately well 
beyond the space limitations of the present article. It is, however, something we are exploring in 
detail in a companion working paper. See Neel U. Sukhatme & Jay Jenkins, Eliminating the 
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APPENDIX 
FIGURE A.1. INDIVIDUAL CASE APPOINTMENT FORM—HARRIS COUNTY 
  
 
Incentive Gap and Pay to Play in the Right to Counsel: Public Defenders, Caseload Limits and 
Contingent Fees in Criminal Defense (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Authors). There, we 
examine possible ways to eliminate the incentive gap, including expanding public defender 
networks, imposing mandatory caseload limits on defense attorneys, and adopting contingency 
fee payments in assigned counsel and contract attorney cases. We argue that these reforms would 
alter attorney and judicial incentives in meaningful ways that would help indigent defendants. 
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TABLE A1: CASES ASSIGNED / REVENUE EARNED FOR DONORS TO 
ASSIGNING JUDGE VS. DONORS TO ANOTHER JUDGE 
 
TABLE A2: CASES ASSIGNED / REVENUE EARNED FOR EACH DOLLAR 
DONATED TO ASSIGNING JUDGE (LIMITED TO ATTORNEYS WHO DONATED 
TO SOME JUDGE) 
  
SUKHATME IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/16/2020  1:35 AM 
2021] PAY TO PLAY? 845 
 
TABLE A3: CASES ASSIGNED / REVENUE EARNED FOR ATTORNEYS WHO 
DONATED MULTIPLE TIMES TO AN ASSIGNING JUDGE VS. ATTORNEYS WHO 
DONATED ZERO OR ONE TIME TO THAT JUDGE 
 
TABLE A4: CASES ASSIGNED / REVENUE EARNED FOR ATTORNEYS WHO 
DONATED MULTIPLE TIMES TO AN ASSIGNING JUDGE VS. ALL  
OTHER DONOR ATTORNEYS 
